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An Empirical Study of Certain Settlement-Related Motions
for Vacatur in Patent Cases
*

JEREMY W. BOCK

When parties jointly move to vacate otherwise proper rulings as part of a
settlement agreement, district courts often oblige. While the general practice of
vacating rulings to facilitate settlement has been criticized in the academic
literature as depriving the public of the benefit of judicial precedents, there are
hardly any empirical studies on the prevalence of this practice and its effects,
particularly at the district court level where the efficiencies arising from
settlement—and the resulting pressure on the court to grant vacatur—are much
greater compared to the appellate level. This Article endeavors to add an empirical
study to the literature on settlement-related vacatur, focusing on district courts in
the specific context of patent litigation. In patent cases, the impact of vacating
rulings on the public interest is most acute where the affected ruling pertains to the
scope, validity, or enforceability of a patent because the cost of relitigating those
issues—without the economy of collateral estoppel—may dissuade potential
challenges to suspect patents or unmeritorious infringement claims.
The empirical study analyzes a dataset of 79 patent cases in which settlementrelated motions for vacatur were filed over a five-year period (January 2006 to
January 2011) that targeted certain rulings adverse to patentees. In those 79 cases,
motions for vacatur were granted in 62 cases (78.5%), denied in 15 cases (19%),
and withdrawn by the parties in 2 cases (2.5%). The data reveal that district courts
appear to prioritize near-term docket management concerns when granting
vacatur—even when it would undermine judicial economy and the public interest.
Indeed, district courts routinely granted vacatur without providing a reasoned
explanation, without regard to the litigation history of the patent or the
litigiousness of the patentee, and with a degree of alacrity that would effectively
prevent interested third parties from filing timely motions to intervene to oppose
vacatur. Overall, the data suggest that granting settlement-related vacatur is a
false economy: it leaves the judiciary vulnerable to manipulation, and burdens the
public with the anticompetitive effects of weak patents.
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INTRODUCTION
The practice of courts vacating1 otherwise proper rulings for no reason other
than that the parties have requested it in connection with a settlement raises
questions about the public nature of adjudication and the risk of strategic behavior
by litigants.2 However, to the litigants who request such relief, and the courts that
grant it, its virtue lies in its apparent efficiency in facilitating settlement to conserve
both private and public resources. Are they right? Or, could the grant of vacatur be
a false economy? This is a question over which opinions differ, even among
eminent jurists.3 Yet, empirical studies of the prevalence and effects of settlement-

1. Vacatur is “[t]he act of annulling or setting aside.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1688
(9th ed. 2009). The verb form is “vacate,” which is defined as “[t]o nullify or cancel; make
void; invalidate <the court vacated the judgment>.” Id.
2. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior
Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 589, 593 (1991)
(“[T]he effect of vacatur on the litigation process extends beyond judicial waste; it perverts
the judicial decision into a negotiable commodity, engendering distortion of, and disrespect
for, the role of the courts.”); see also Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of
Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 54–55 (2004) (“[C]ourts have, in essence, ‘rediscovered’ the vacatur
procedure . . . and have created something very different and potentially dangerous to law.”);
Daniel Purcell, Comment, The Public Right to Precedent: A Theory and Rejection of
Vacatur, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 867, 916 (1997) (“[A] litigant has no right to be free of a nondefective adverse judgment.”).
3. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1227–28 (2000) (“According to
Judge Winter of the Second Circuit, a decision not to vacate a judgment wastes both the
litigants and the court’s resources by requiring the continuation of litigation that could have
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related vacatur are scarce4 and focus primarily on appellate courts,5 which may not
account for the specific characteristics of district courts,6 where the potential
savings in judicial economy from settlement are far greater.7
This Article analyzes the results of an empirical study on settlement-related
vacatur at the district court level, focusing specifically on patent cases. Patent cases
are well suited for detailed empirical investigations because of the availability of
specialized databases—such as the Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse (IPLC)8
and Docket Navigator9—that allow the systematic searching and review of district
court patent case dockets collected from PACER.10
In addition, the potential for repetitive litigation makes patent cases a propitious
vehicle for studying the conditions under which settlement-related vacatur is
requested and granted. A patentee who files suit risks having the asserted patent
narrowed in scope, invalidated, or held unenforceable. When confronted with an
adverse ruling that could impair future assertions, licensing, or the overall valuation
of the asserted patent, most patentees will eventually settle.11 To escape the
consequences of an adverse ruling without further litigation, some patentees will
been settled. . . . By contrast, Judge Easterbrook, analyzing the same problem, came to the
opposite conclusion.”).
4. Id. at 1229 (“[I]t is difficult to draw a firm conclusion about the efficacy of the
vacatur practice in the absence of empirical evidence.”).
5. See, e.g., Stephen R. Barnett, Making Decisions Disappear: Depublication and
Stipulated Reversal in the California Supreme Court, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1033, 1073 n.221
(1993) (empirical study of stipulated reversals in California appellate courts concluding that
stipulated reversal is not an important factor in promoting settlement).
6. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Margo Schlanger, Christina L. Boyd & Andrew D.
Martin, How Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
83, 87 (2009) (“[I]n the relatively scant empirical literature on district courts, little attention
has been paid to how their institutional features shape judges’ decision-making. Empirical
studies of district courts have tended unreflectively to borrow models developed to study the
appellate courts . . . .”); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 418
(1982) [hereinafter Resnik, Managerial Judges] (“[W]hat works for the courts of appeals
cannot simply be transplanted into trial courts.”).
7. See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 28 (1994)
(“[T]he judicial economies achieved by settlement at the district-court level are ordinarily
much more extensive than those achieved by settlement on appeal.”).
8. Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse, STAN. L. SCH., http://www.law.stanford.edu/
program/centers/iplc. The IPLC is presently operated by a private company, Lex Machina, Inc. in
Palo Alto, California. (For more information on the company, see LEX MACHINA,
https://lexmachina.com.) The dataset for the empirical study reported in this Article was compiled
primarily through the IPLC. See infra Part III.
9. Docket Navigator is provided by Hopkins Bruce Publishers Corp., in Abilene,
Texas. See DOCKET NAVIGATOR, https://docketnavigator.com.
10. PACER, which is an acronym for Public Access to Court Electronic Records, is an
electronic service provided by the federal judiciary that allows users to obtain case
information from federal appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts. PACER,
http://www.pacer.gov.
11. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U.
L. REV. 237, 259 (2006) (empirical study of patent cases filed in 1995, 1997, and 2000,
finding that “approximately 80% of patent cases settle”).
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attempt to secure its nullification in the course of reaching a settlement. Because a
vacated ruling has no preclusive or precedential force,12 this option is attractive to
patentees who want to strip any potential collateral estoppel13 effect from an
inconvenient ruling.14 To make vacatur more palatable to the district court, which
likely invested considerable resources to produce the ruling targeted for vacatur, a
patentee typically requests vacatur in an unopposed or joint motion with the
accused infringer, who, in accordance with the settlement agreement, acquiesces in
its filing.15 In some instances, a patentee may expressly condition the settlement on
the grant of vacatur, such that a denial will void the settlement. Consistent with the
judiciary’s strong preference for settlement,16 district courts granted vacatur in a
clear majority of cases in the dataset (78.5%; 62 out of 79 cases)17 compiled for this
Article. This is not surprising given that district judges are under pressure to
manage their dockets efficiently and clear any backlogs,18 and so settlement is the

12. Vacatur “clears the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and
eliminates a judgment.” United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950); see also
Rumsfeld v. Freedom NY, Inc., 329 F.3d 1320, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[A] vacated
judgment has no preclusive force either as a matter of collateral or direct estoppel or as a
matter of the law of the case.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13. Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, may bar relitigation of an issue
if: (1) the issue is identical to one decided in a prior action; (2) the issue was actually
litigated in the prior action; (3) the resolution of the issue was essential to a final judgment in
the prior action; and (4) the party defending against issue preclusion had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States,
319 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
14. Collateral estoppel may be used to establish: (1) invalidity, see, e.g., BlonderTongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (holding that any subsequent
defendant may reap benefit of prior invalidity decision under principles of collateral
estoppel); (2) unenforceability, see, e.g., Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc.,
170 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“An unrelated accused infringer may likewise take
advantage of an unenforceability decision under the collateral estoppel doctrine.”); (3)
noninfringement, see, e.g., Molinaro v. Fannon/Courier Corp., 745 F.2d 651, 655 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement based on
collateral estoppel); and (4) claim constructions, see, e.g., TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72
F. Supp. 2d 370, 375–79 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (according collateral estoppel effect to a claim
construction order).
15. Throughout this Article, the term “motion” will refer to motions for vacatur that are
jointly filed or unopposed, unless specified otherwise.
16. The judiciary’s preference for settlement is succinctly expressed in “the familiar
axiom that a bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial.” In re Warner
Comm’ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Judith Resnik,
Mediating Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process and Judicial Preferences for
Settlement, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 155, 159 (“[J]udges have put their institutional authority
behind settlement as the mode of disposition to be preferred.”).
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology,
District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 705–06 (2007) (“[S]cholars have
been insufficiently attendant to the shaming sanctions that judges face if they fall too far
behind on their docket. In essence, Congress (through the Administrative Office) publishes a
list naming judges whose dockets are too full. Such dilatory judges face the gentle ribbing of
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preferred method for case disposal because it clears the docket without the risk of
appeal and reversal.19
However, the routine nullification of rulings affecting the scope, validity, or
enforceability of a patent adversely affects the public interest,20 as it facilitates the
reassertion of weak patents21 and undermines the finality of judgments.22 Once the
unfavorable rulings associated with a patent have been vacated, the patentee can
freely assert that patent against other potential defendants, who are confronted with
the choice of relitigating the same issues at considerable expense23 or taking a
license to a patent that might be invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.24
their fellows at the judicial lunch table and the harsh glare of the media spotlight.”).
19. Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit, who often sits by designation at the
trial court level, summarizes this dynamic as follows:
District judges often have heavy dockets; a single judge in an urban district
will have several hundred cases pending before him. Most of these will be
settled or abandoned without the judge’s intervention. But enough will remain
that require court action to induce the judge to attend to them lest his backlog
become unmanageable. He cannot be cavalier in disposing of these cases, as
then his reversal rate would rise to an embarrassing level. So backlog pressure
keeps him working hard and reversal threat keeps him working carefully—
though an alternative strategy is to push the parties to settle, since settlements
reduce backlog without risk of reversal.
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 141 (2008).
20. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343
(1971) (“‘A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. . . . The far-reaching
social and economic consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a paramount
interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other
inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope.’”
(quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816
(1945))).
21. See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 n.19 (1969) (noting “the public’s
interest in the elimination of specious patents”).
22. See, e.g., Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100 (1993) (“[O]ur
prior cases have identified a strong public interest in the finality of judgments in patent
litigation.”).
23. In 2011, the median cost of patent litigation for cases having: (i) less than $1 million
at risk was $650,000; (ii) $1-$25 million at risk was $2.5 million; and (iii) more than $25
million at risk was $5 million. LAW PRACTICE MGMT. COMM., AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW
ASSOC., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 35 (2011).
24. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 338 (“In each successive suit the patentee
enjoys the statutory presumption of validity, and so may easily put the alleged infringer to
his expensive proof. As a consequence, prospective defendants will often decide that paying
royalties under a license or other settlement is preferable to the costly burden of challenging
the patent.”). Experienced patent jurists at the district court level, such as Leonard Davis of
the Eastern District of Texas and T.S. Ellis, III, of the Eastern District of Virginia, have
expressed similar concerns about the distortion of patent litigation by its sheer cost. See, e.g.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order at 5, Raylon LLC v. Complus Data Innovations, No. 6:09cv-00355-LED (E.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2011), ECF No. 147 (Davis, J.) (“[T]his Court has some
concerns about plaintiffs who file cases with extremely weak infringement positions in order
to settle for less than the cost of defense . . . . Such a practice is an abuse of the judicial
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Furthermore, given the complex and highly contentious nature of patent litigation,25
considerable judicial resources were likely spent adjudicating the vacated rulings,
which may include claim construction orders, summary judgment rulings, and even
jury verdicts.26 Despite the significant competing interests of the settling parties,
the public, and the judiciary implicated by settlement-related motions for vacatur27
in patent cases, there is not much guidance in the caselaw on when it may be
appropriate for a district court to grant or deny them.28
In the absence of clear precedent, empirical research may help bring into relief
the various considerations—both public and private—for evaluating whether
granting settlement-related vacatur may be appropriate in a particular case and to
inform further doctrinal development.29 Timing-wise, an empirical study would be
useful in light of certain trends and recent developments in the patent field that may
prompt patentees to file settlement-related vacatur motions in more cases. First, the
patent monetization trend is accelerating, whereby practicing companies, with their
patent stockpiles, are increasingly adopting the tactics of—and, in some cases,
selling their patents to and even teaming up with—patent assertion entities
(PAEs)30 (colloquially known as “patent trolls”) to generate revenue through
system and threatens the integrity of and respect for the courts.”); T.S. Ellis, III, Distortion of
Patent Economics by Litigation Costs, in 5 CASRIP PUBLICATION SERIES: STREAMLINING
INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 22, 23 (1999), available at http://www.law.washington.edu/
casrip/symposium/Number5/pub5atcl3.pdf (“[B]urgeoning litigation costs have distorted
patent markets by significantly discouraging potential patent challenges, hence distorting
competition to a degree beyond that justified by the intrinsic strength or merit of the
patent.”).
25. See, e.g., Kathleen M. O’Malley, Patti Saris & Ronald H. Whyte, A Panel
Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 671, 682 (2004) (“Patent litigation is like the neurosurgery of litigation: it is hard
scientifically and it is hard legally. Trial court judges kill themselves on a trial . . . . Every
single issue is raised; every one is preserved.” (statement of Judge Patti Saris of the District
of Massachusetts)).
26. See infra Part IV.A.1.
27. See generally 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2863 (2d ed. 1995) (observing that when
parties request vacatur in connection with settlement, “[t]he question involves a balancing of
the desire to encourage voluntary settlements and reduce appeals with the public interest in
preserving the judgment to enhance judicial economy by allowing it to be used for issue
preclusion purposes and in avoiding the possibility that repeat litigants effectively may
control the development of the law by erasing unfavorable judgments”).
28. See infra Part I.
29. Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 393 (1986)
(“[T]he federal courts have been an arena of massive experimentation in judicial
administration. . . . Very few of these experiments have been conceived or evaluated in a
scientific spirit and this may help explain why the federal courts remain in a state of crisis.
Maybe a dose of social science is the thing, or one of the things, that the system needs.”).
30. Patent assertion entities (PAEs) are firms whose business model focuses on purchasing
and asserting patents. Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 300 (2010)
[hereinafter Chien, Arms Race] (defining PAEs); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING
IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 8 n.5 (2011),
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aggressive licensing campaigns backed by enforcement litigation.31 As a result,
increasing numbers of patentees may seek vacatur of an adverse ruling that affects
a patent with a prior history of successful licensing in order to maintain the flow of
royalty payments. Second, the recently-enacted Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
of 2011 restricts the joinder of defendants to those instances where there exist
questions of fact common to all the defendants, and the alleged infringement arises
out of “the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.”32
Accordingly, a patentee who intends to assert the same patent against multiple
defendants will have a strong incentive to seek vacatur of any adverse rulings that
may have preclusive effects in other suits.
Against this backdrop, the empirical study presented in this Article explores the
current practice relating to settlement-related vacatur in patent cases to determine
how and to what extent the practice should be curtailed. To provide the necessary
context for the presentation of the results and their implications, Part I provides an
overview of the current legal framework under which settlement-related motions
for vacatur are brought. Part II describes the design of the empirical study and
provides a summary of the results. Part III explains the compilation of the dataset.
Part IV analyzes the results from the dataset relating to the content, filing, and
disposition of vacatur motions, as well as certain second-order effects on the public
interest and judicial economy. Part V discusses further implications and provides
recommendations for future doctrinal development. A brief conclusion summarizes
the salient points.
I. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
At the district court level, motions to vacate an otherwise proper ruling in order
to facilitate settlement are typically brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) or 54(b),
depending on the procedural posture of the case at the time of the motion. If the
motion is filed after the entry of final judgment,33 a district court may consider it
under Rule 60(b)(6), which empowers the court to grant relief from a final
judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief”34 if “extraordinary
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf (using similar definition of
PAEs).
31. Chien, Arms Race, supra note 30, at 342 (“A number of companies . . . have found it
profitable to enforce, through licensing, their once defensive portfolios. Others, like General
Electric, . . . sue companies in technology areas in which they do not practice. Practicing
company patents, when sold on the market, can also end up being asserted by patentassertion entities.”).
32. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19, 125 Stat. 284, 333
(2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 299).
33. “A ‘final decision’ generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324
U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (citation omitted).
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6). The grounds for relief from a final judgment under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b) are:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under [FED. R. CIV. P.]
59(b);

926

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:919

circumstances” exist.35 If the motion is filed prior to the entry of final judgment, a
district court may consider it under Rule 54(b),36 which vests the court with
inherent authority to modify or reconsider non-final or “interlocutory” orders.37
Although the invocation of collateral estoppel generally requires a final judgment,38
interlocutory orders may also be accorded collateral estoppel effect under certain
circumstances,39 such that parties will often seek vacatur of non-final rulings out of
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on
an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). Of the six enumerated reasons, only the Rule 60(b)(6) “catch-all”
could potentially accommodate a motion to vacate an otherwise proper ruling after the entry
of final judgment. The other enumerated reasons in Rule 60(b)(1)–(5) relate to situations
where the judgment is in some way defective or no longer appropriate, and thus warrant
vacatur for reasons other than simply to facilitate settlement.
35. See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863–64 (1988)
(observing that Rule 60(b)(6) “does not particularize the factors that justify relief, but we
have previously noted that it provides courts with authority adequate to enable them to
vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice, while also
cautioning that it should only be applied in ‘extraordinary circumstances’” (internal citations
omitted) (quotation marks omitted)); see also Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d
112, 118 n.2 (4th Cir. 2000) (observing that “the difference between Rule 60(b)(6) and Rules
60(b)(1)-(5) is that ‘extraordinary circumstances’ are required to bring the [Rule 60(b)(6)]
motion within the ‘other reason’ language of that Rule” (alteration in original) (internal
quotations omitted) (citing Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 863 n.11)); see also 12 JAMES WM. MOORE,
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE: CIVIL § 60.48 (Daniel R. Coquillette, Gregory P. Joseph, Sol
Schreiber, Georgene M. Vairo & Chilton Davis Varner eds., 3d ed. 2012); 11 WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 27 at § 2864.
36. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides, in pertinent part:
[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties
does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised
at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and
all the parties’ rights and liabilities.
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
37. An “interlocutory order” is “[a]n order that relates to some intermediate matter in
the case; any order other than a final order.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1207 (9th ed. 2009).
38. See supra note 13.
39. See, e.g., Dana v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 342 F.3d 1320, 1323–25 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(applying Eleventh Circuit law in holding that partial summary judgment orders satisfied
legal prerequisites for applying collateral estoppel). Whether a ruling is entitled to collateral
estoppel effect is a procedural issue, such that a district court would apply the law of its
regional circuit—rather than Federal Circuit law—in analyzing whether the doctrine is
applicable in a given case. See Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp., 279 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (“Because the application of collateral estoppel is not a matter within the exclusive
jurisdiction of this court, this court applies the law of the circuit in which the district court
sits . . . .” (internal citation omitted)). Some circuits have a stricter view of the finality
requirement for collateral estoppel than others. Compare Golman v. Tesoro Drilling Corp.,
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an abundance of caution.40 Under either Rule 60(b)(6) or Rule 54(b), the decision
to vacate is committed to the discretion of the district court41 and is evaluated under
the law of the regional circuit unless the motion implicates patent law, at which
point Federal Circuit law applies.42 However, as explained below, the Federal
Circuit has thus far provided scant—and possibly conflicting—guidance to the
district courts on when settlement-related vacatur may be appropriate.43
In general, the leading case on the subject is the Supreme Court’s 1994 opinion
in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership,44 a bankruptcy case
that settled after the Supreme Court granted certiorari.45 In Bancorp, the Supreme
Court denied the petitioner’s motion to vacate the judgment under review, holding
that “[w]here mootness results from settlement . . . the losing party has voluntarily
forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby
surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur.”46 In characterizing
vacatur as an “extraordinary remedy” to which “equitable entitlement” must be
shown,47 the Court stressed that “mootness by reason of settlement does not justify
vacatur” in the absence of “exceptional circumstances,” where “exceptional

700 F.2d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 1983) (“An order granting partial summary judgment is
interlocutory; it has no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect.”), with Lummus Co. v.
Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J.) (“‘Finality’ . . .
may mean little more than that the litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage
that a court sees no really good reason for permitting it to be litigated again.”). For this
reason, Federal Circuit Judge Timothy Dyk has observed that the goal of uniformity in
patent law may be better served by having the Federal Circuit apply its own rules on
collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Vardon Golf Co. v. Karsten Mfg. Corp., 294 F.3d 1330, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (Dyk, J., concurring) (“There is simply no reason why an earlier patent
judgment should have one consequence in the Third Circuit and another in the Seventh
Circuit, for example. Such an approach encourages the very forum shopping that our
regional circuit law approach was designed to prevent.”).
40. See infra Parts IV.A.1–2.
41. See, e.g., 12 MOORE, supra note 35, at § 56.124[1] (“Courts have inherent power to
reconsider interlocutory orders [under Rule 54(b)], including grants of partial summary
judgment and denials of summary judgment.”); 11 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, at § 2857
(“As is recognized in many cases, a motion for relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b) is
addressed to the discretion of the court . . . .”).
42. Compare Louisville Bedding Co. v. Pillowtex Corp., 455 F.3d 1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (“A district court’s denial of a motion under [Rule] 60(b)(6) is not a procedural issue
unique to patent law, and thus we will apply the law of the regional circuit court . . . .
Moreover, the underlying reasons for Louisville’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion . . . do not uniquely
implicate patent law.” (citation omitted)), with Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 279 F.3d
1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen a district court’s Rule 60(b) ruling turns on
substantive matters that pertain to patent law, we review the ruling under Federal Circuit law
because ‘we perceive a clear need for uniformity and certainty in the way the district courts
treat [the] issue.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Broyhill Furniture Indus., Inc. v.
Craftmaster Furniture Corp., 12 F.3d 1080, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 1993))).
43. See infra notes 58–86 and accompanying text.
44. 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
45. Id. at 20.
46. Id. at 25.
47. Id. at 26.
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circumstances do not include the mere fact that the settlement agreement provides
for vacatur.”48
Because Bancorp was decided in the context of vacatur by federal appellate
courts, which is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2106,49 its holding is not considered
binding precedent for district courts.50 Indeed, the Court sidestepped the issue of
vacatur at the district court level by concluding the Bancorp opinion with a
suggestion to the appellate courts to essentially punt the issue:
[E]ven in the absence of, or before considering the existence of,
extraordinary circumstances, a court of appeals presented with a request
for vacatur of a district-court judgment may remand the case with
instructions that the district court consider the request, which it may do
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).51
Nevertheless, because the holding in Bancorp turns on the equitable nature of
vacatur as a form of extraordinary relief—as opposed to any inherent
characteristics of the appellate courts52—at least one regional circuit court has
treated the Bancorp “exceptional circumstances” requirement as being essentially
coextensive with the showing of “extraordinary circumstances” required for Rule
60(b)(6),53 which similarly precludes relief if the movant deliberately chose not to
appeal.54 However, not all circuits share this view, as some have espoused a less
rigorous standard than “extraordinary circumstances” for settlement-related vacatur
at the district court level.55 Further complicating the situation is the lack of

48. Id. at 29.
49. The Supreme Court and the courts of appeal derive their power to vacate judgments
from 28 U.S.C. § 2106, which states:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm,
modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a
court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and
direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require
such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.
28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006).
50. See, e.g., Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112, 117 (4th Cir. 2000)
(observing that “the holding of Bancorp extends only to appellate court vacatur”); see also
Dana v. E.S. Originals, Inc. 342 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Dyk, J., concurring)
(“[B]y its terms, Bancorp does not apply to district courts but rather only to the Supreme
Court and to courts of appeals.” (citing Valero, 211 F.3d at 117–20)).
51. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 29.
52. See Valero, 211 F.3d at 118–19 (“[T]he particular considerations adopted by the
Court in Bancorp derived exclusively from the extraordinary and equitable nature of the
relief of vacatur, rather than . . . from any power or ability unique to the appellate courts.”).
53. See id. at 121 (“[T]he Bancorp considerations that are relevant to appellate vacatur
for mootness are also relevant to, and likewise largely determinative of, a district court’s
vacatur decision for mootness under Rule 60(b)(6) . . . .”); supra note 35.
54. See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 200 (1950) (holding that petitioner
was not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) because of his “voluntary, deliberate, free,
untrammeled choice . . . not to appeal”).
55. See, e.g., Marseilles Hydro Power LLC v. Marseilles Land & Water Co., 481 F.3d
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precedent governing the settlement-related vacatur of interlocutory rulings under
Rule 54(b),56 even though, as discussed in greater detail in Part IV, a substantial
proportion of vacatur motions are filed prior to the entry of final judgment.57
Turning now to the Federal Circuit, no post-Bancorp58 Federal Circuit decision
has squarely analyzed the merits of a district court’s decision to grant or deny
vacatur in light of various private, public, and judicial considerations. To the extent
that post-Bancorp Federal Circuit precedent exists, it either relates to procedural or
collateral issues without reaching the merits of the district court’s disposition of a
vacatur motion,59 or focuses on the Federal Circuit’s own ability to vacate the
judgment of its subordinate tribunals.60
The lack of instructive Federal Circuit precedent reflects the rarity of appeals
challenging a district court’s disposition of a settlement-related motion for vacatur.
In order for such an appeal to exist, a third-party objector who was properly granted

1002, 1003 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The Court in Bancorp said that the court of appeals can remand
a case even in the absence of [exceptional] circumstances, which would make no sense if the
district court could not vacate its judgment in that absence.” (internal citation omitted)); Am.
Games, Inc. v. Trade Prods., Inc., 142 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1998) (“According to the
post-[Bancorp] Ninth Circuit decisions, the district court below could have vacated its own
judgment using [an] equitable balancing test even if [the parties] had mooted their case by
settlement.”).
56. See, e.g., Lycos, Inc. v. Blockbuster, Inc., No. 07-11469-MLW, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 136252, at *7 (D. Mass. Dec. 23, 2010) (“Although the court has the power to
modify the orders at issue, there is little authority describing when, if ever, the court should
exercise this power to grant vacatur of a non-final order in connection with settlement.”).
57. See infra Parts IV.A.1–2.
58. Pre-Bancorp cases are not instructive because in that era, the Federal Circuit had an
established practice of vacating the judgment under review whenever the parties settled on
appeal. See, e.g., Laber v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 982 F.2d 519, 520 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“When
parties settle while a case is on appeal, the proper course is not to dismiss. It is to vacate the
trial tribunal’s decision and to remand to the trial tribunal with instructions to dismiss.”).
This practice is disallowed under Bancorp and is no longer in use at the Federal Circuit.
59. See, e.g., Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., 629 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (remanding case for limited purpose of allowing district court to consider parties’
settlement-related motion for vacatur); Ericsson, Inc. v. InterDigital Commc’ns Corp., 418
F.3d 1217, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We have reversed the district court’s decision allowing
Nokia to intervene to seek reinstatement of the vacated orders. . . . [I]t is not necessary for us
to address whether the district court’s original vacatur order in light of the settlement was
proper under [Bancorp].”).
60. See, e.g., Tessera, Inc. v. ITC, 646 F.3d 1357, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that
expiration of patents during litigation caused mootness by happenstance, and applying
Bancorp to vacate a portion of the ITC’s final determination relating to expired patents),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2702 (2012); Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(denying vacatur because “the agency [(the losing party)] itself has voluntarily withdrawn
the regulations and thus set the stage for a declaration of mootness”); Kaw Nation v. Norton,
405 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (vacating decision of Interior Board of Contract Appeals
under Bancorp in light of “exceptional circumstances” arising from the potential effect of
judgment on the party that objected to circumstances that caused mootness, and uncertainty
regarding the Board’s authority to resolve the dispute); Aqua Marine Supply v. AIM
Machining, Inc., 247 F.3d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (denying vacatur where appeal was mooted
by settlement).
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intervention61 must appeal from the district court’s decision to grant vacatur. This is
expected to be rare for two reasons. First, third-party objectors may not become
aware of the grant of vacatur until it is too late to seek intervention.62 Second,
motions for intervention are often unsuccessful because preserving the collateral
estoppel effect of a ruling is not deemed a substantial interest that justifies
intervention as of right,63 and courts are unlikely to grant permissive intervention64
in such circumstances, given their preference to have cases settle without
interference by third parties.65
In view of the lack of post-Bancorp Federal Circuit precedent addressing the
merits of settlement-related vacatur at the district court level, perhaps the most
relevant guidance to date may be found in a few concurring opinions, most notably
in Dana v. E.S. Originals, Inc.66 and Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc.67
In Dana, the plaintiff sought to invoke offensive collateral estoppel based on a
non-final ruling in order to prevent the accused infringers from asserting certain

61. See, e.g., Ericsson, 418 F.3d at 1224 (“Without intervention, there is no proper party
with standing to be afforded relief under Rule 60(b). Therefore, it is not necessary for us to
address whether the district court’s original vacatur order in light of the settlement was
proper under [Bancorp].”).
62. See Fisch, supra note 2, at 621 n.165 (“[I]t is rare that third parties who might
benefit from the preclusive effect of a judgment will learn of the threat to the judgment in
time to make their presence known to the court.”).
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). A third party’s interest in preserving the collateral estoppel
effect of a ruling is not deemed a protectable interest for purposes of intervention as of right.
See, e.g., Korczak v. Sedeman, 427 F.3d 419, 420 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The opportunity to use a
judgment in a suit to which one is not a party to gain an advantage in a suit to which one is a
party is valuable, but the denial of the opportunity is not a sufficient injury to confer
standing.”); Purcell v. BankAtlantic Fin. Corp., 85 F.3d 1508, 1513 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[The
potential intervenor’s] interest in the collateral estoppel effect of the jury’s verdict in this
case is too collateral, indirect, and insubstantial to support intervention as of right.”). More
generally, the relationship between intervention and Article III standing remains unsettled.
See, e.g., Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[A]t
some fundamental level the proposed intervenor must have a stake in the litigation. Some
disagreement remains among the circuits about how Article III standing rules intersect with
the requirements for Rule 24 intervention. This remains a question that the Supreme Court
has not resolved.” (citations omitted)); see also 6 MOORE, supra note 35, at § 24.03[2][d]
(“[T]here is confusion and conflict among the federal courts regarding whether movants to
intervene [as of right] must independently satisfy standing requirements in addition to the
requirements of Rule 24(a)(2).”).
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(B) (“On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to
intervene who . . . has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common
question of law or fact.”).
65. See, e.g., Purcell, 85 F.3d at 1513 (noting that “public policy values . . . are
furthered by permitting parties to settle a case without the interference of interlopers”); see
also FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(3) (“In exercising its discretion [to grant permissive intervention],
the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the original parties’ rights.”).
66. 342 F.3d 1320, 1327–29 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Dyk, J., concurring).
67. 629 F.3d 1374, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., concurring).
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defenses.68 The Federal Circuit held that the non-final ruling satisfied the legal
requirements for collateral estoppel, but remanded the case for additional findings
relating to its offensive (as opposed to defensive) use.69 In concurrence, Federal
Circuit Judge Timothy Dyk suggested that parties who settle during district court
litigation might consider moving to vacate non-final rulings so as to prevent them
from having collateral estoppel effect.70 According to Judge Dyk, Bancorp posed
no barrier to such an arrangement: “Bancorp did not . . . address the power of the
district court to vacate non-final orders pursuant to a settlement agreement. Indeed,
by its terms, Bancorp does not apply to district courts but rather only to the
Supreme Court and to courts of appeals.”71 Notably, in the dataset compiled for the
empirical study, Judge Dyk’s concurrence in Dana was cited in the vacatur motions
filed in at least 16 cases72 (out of 79), targeting non-final rulings as well as final
judgments, and it was also cited in the orders issued in 2 cases granting vacatur of
non-final rulings.
In contrast to Judge Dyk’s concurrence in Dana, Federal Circuit Judge
Kimberly Moore’s concurrence in Ohio Willow Wood suggests that Bancorp is
highly relevant at the district court level, taking the view that settlement-related
vacatur in the absence of “exceptional circumstances” may adversely impact the
public interest.73 Ohio Willow Wood was a precedential order issued by the Federal
Circuit in 2011 that formalized its practice of granting “limited remands” to allow
the parties to jointly move the district court to vacate the appealed judgment in
connection with a settlement. The “limited remand” practice appears to originate
from the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Bancorp that an appeals court, when
presented with a request to vacate a district court judgment, could remand the case
to allow the district court to consider vacatur.74 Although this practice has been in
use at the Federal Circuit since the Bancorp decision,75 the “limited remand” orders
were apparently all nonprecedential before the Ohio Willow Wood order was issued
in 2011.76
Notably, the precedential portion of the Ohio Willow Wood order did not contain
any official pronouncements on whether settlement-related motions for vacatur

68. Dana, 342 F.3d at 1320–23.
69. Id. at 1325–27.
70. Id. at 1328 (Dyk, J., concurring) (noting that preventing non-final decisions from
having collateral estoppel effect in future litigation “could perhaps be accomplished by
moving to vacate the district court’s earlier decision as part of the settlement”).
71. Id.
72. Some motions were filed under seal, so 16 is a lower bound.
73. Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., 629 F.3d 1374, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Moore, J., concurring).
74. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 29 (1994).
75. Bancorp was decided in November 1994. The earliest post-Bancorp case (for which
an opinion is electronically available on Lexis), where the Federal Circuit appears to follow
Bancorp’s suggestion and remands a case to a subordinate tribunal for it to consider a
vacatur motion, is Dyncorp v. O’Leary, No. 94-1493, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 449 (Fed. Cir.
Jan. 4, 1995).
76. This is based on a Lexis search of Federal Circuit opinions and orders issued
between the Bancorp ruling and the Ohio Willow Wood order.
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should be granted by district courts.77 Rather, the panel unanimously decided to
entrust the disposition of the vacatur motion to the discretion of the district court
from which the appeal originated.78 However, one of the panel members, Judge
Moore, cautioned in a concurring opinion that the Federal Circuit’s limited remand
order should not be “construed as an imprimatur on the joint vacatur motion.”79
Citing Bancorp and extending its holding to the district court context, Judge Moore
stressed that “[o]nly in ‘exceptional circumstances’ should a district court grant
vacatur at the request of the litigants.”80 Emphasizing that “patents are public rather
than private rights,”81 Judge Moore observed that “[t]he public rights are
particularly vulnerable when considering vacatur following settlement,” as “[t]here
will be no opposing voice when the parties move for vacatur because both parties
benefit.”82 Included among the considerations Judge Moore highlighted as relevant
to deciding a motion to vacate are the litigiousness of the patentee and the value of
collateral estoppel in saving the courts and litigants the time and expense of
relitigating issues in patent cases, which are among the most time-consuming and
costly types of civil actions.83
At one level, the apparent inconsistency between Judge Dyk’s concurrence in
Dana and Judge Moore’s concurrence in Ohio Willow Wood on the relevance of
Bancorp to settlement-related vacatur at the district court level might be
attributable to the fact that a non-final order was at issue in Dana, whereas Ohio
Willow Wood involved a final judgment. However, as explained in greater detail in
later sections, the data reveal that treating non-final rulings differently from final
judgments in the context of settlement-related vacatur promote neither judicial
economy nor the public interest.84 In addition, a further wrinkle in the Federal
Circuit’s messaging on the issue of settlement-related vacatur is introduced by its
Appellate Mediation Program:85 to some parties, the Chief Circuit Mediator
apparently suggests the filing of a motion to vacate certain rulings under review—
including invalidity rulings—in order to facilitate settlement.86 However, as a

77. See Ohio Willow Wood, 629 F.3d at 1375.
78. Id. On remand, the district court in Ohio Willow Wood denied vacatur even though it
would void the parties’ settlement. Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., 769 F.
Supp. 2d 1065, 1070–71 (E.D. Tex. 2011). When the parties resumed their appeal, the
district court’s judgment was summarily affirmed. Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply,
Inc., 440 F. App’x 926 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
79. Ohio Willow Wood, 629 F.3d at 1376. (Moore, J., concurring). Viewing Judge
Moore’s concurrence as “placing an appellate thumb on the scale of the remand order before
it reaches its destination,” another member of the panel, Federal Circuit Judge Pauline
Newman, wrote separately to stress that Judge Moore’s concurrence was not part of the
remand order. Id. at 1376 (Newman, J., additional views).
80. Id. (Moore, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
81. Id.
82. Id. at n.1.
83. See id. at 1376–77.
84. See infra Parts IV.A.1–2, V.B.
85. For generalized information about the Federal Circuit’s Appellate Mediation
http://www.cafc.
Program, see Mediation, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT,
uscourts.gov/mediation/mediation.html.
86. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
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matter of official court policy, neither the Federal Circuit nor its Appellate
Mediation Program takes a position on whether such motions should be granted.87
Thus, in the absence of any post-Bancorp precedential opinions on the merits of
settlement-related vacatur by district courts, the Federal Circuit, which currently
takes no position on whether such motions should be granted, may be, nevertheless,
sending district courts and litigants mixed messages on the issue through the
concurrences in Dana and Ohio Willow Wood, as well as the limited remands based
on the results of its Appellate Mediation Program where motions for settlementrelated vacatur may be proposed by the mediators.
II. DESIGN OF EMPIRICAL STUDY AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS
To critically explore the considerations highlighted in the previous sections, an
empirical study was devised to investigate the following questions: (1) what is the
nature of the current practice relating to the filing and disposition of motions for
settlement-related vacatur? and (2) to what extent should the practice of granting
settlement-related vacatur be curtailed?
To this end, various statistics were gathered to discern the relative influence of,
and the interrelationships among, the three interests implicated by settlementrelated vacatur: (1) the “private” interest of the litigants in resolving their dispute;
(2) the “public” interest—namely those of the general public as well as potential
accused infringers—in the finality of judgments and avoiding dubious claims of
patent infringement; and (3) the “judicial” interest—in particular, the court’s
interest in efficient case management and judicial economy. The conventional
wisdom is that the relative weights of these considerations are heavily biased in
favor of the intersection of the interests of the private parties and the courts, in view
of the judiciary’s strong preference for settlement.88 However, the mechanism and
any second-order effects of this imbalance are not well documented, at least for
district court patent cases. In order to craft a set of workable recommendations to
correct the imbalance, or even to shift it toward the public interest, familiarity with
the nature of the motions filed, their manner of disposition, and their impact is
necessary. Accordingly, descriptive statistics were collected on:
(a) the types of rulings targeted for vacatur, as characterized by the
subject matter, form of issuance, finality (final judgments
versus interlocutory rulings), and age;
(b) the manner in which the courts rule on the motions for vacatur;
(c) case duration;
(d) the extent to which settlements are conditioned on vacatur;
(e) the characteristics of the patents affected by the rulings for
which vacatur is sought (in particular, the litigation history, the
type of patentee, and the technology area); and

87. Appellate Mediation Program Guidelines, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT
(Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/mediation/guidelines.html § 8 (“Neither the
US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit nor its Mediation Program takes a position of
whether the motion for vacatur should be granted.”).
88. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
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(f) whether intervention provides interested third parties with an
adequate means of challenging a motion for settlement-related
vacatur.
As described in greater detail in Part IV, courts granted vacatur in a clear
majority of cases in the dataset (78.5%; 62 out of 79),89 typically without any
detailed analysis (83.9%; 52 out of 62 granted cases),90 and with a degree of
alacrity that would make it difficult for third parties to timely object and move to
intervene—vacatur was granted within 4 days in more than half of the granted
cases (35 out of 62), and, in 22.6% of the granted cases (14 out of 62), vacatur was
granted either on the same day or without a publicly-accessible, written motion
having been filed beforehand.91 Intervention motions were filed in only 4 out of the
79 cases in the dataset (5.1%), and intervention was granted in only one case.92
However, the proportion of cases in which vacatur was denied is surprising—
almost a fifth of vacatur motions were denied (19%; 15 out of 79 cases).93 Because
vacatur is not guaranteed, the filing of settlement-related vacatur motions at the
district court level currently appears to function primarily as a bargaining chip
during settlement negotiations, as opposed to being part of a plan by the patentee to
take a wait-and-see approach to litigation.94 Indeed, the average duration of the
cases where vacatur was granted (1246 days) is similar to that of the cases where
vacatur was denied (1304 days) and of comparable cases where vacatur was never
requested (1218 days).95
Furthermore, the data reveal that district courts appear to grant vacatur largely
without regard to the litigation history of the patent,96 the type of patentee,97
whether the ruling targeted for vacatur is final or interlocutory,98 or the existence of
concurrent proceedings involving the same patent in other courts.99
Overall, the results suggest that district courts in patent cases are routinely
granting vacatur primarily for near-term docket management purposes—even when
it would undermine judicial economy and the public interest in curtailing the
anticompetitive effects of dubious infringement claims and weak patents.
III. COMPILATION OF THE DATASET
The empirical study reported in this Article is based upon an original “vacatur
dataset” of U.S. district court patent cases filed on or after January 1, 2000,100 in

89. See infra Part IV.
90. See infra Part IV.B.
91. See infra Part IV.F.
92. See infra Part IV.F.
93. See infra Part IV.
94. See infra Part IV.C.
95. See infra Part IV.C.
96. See infra Part IV.E.1.
97. See infra Part IV.E.2.
98. See infra Part IV.A.2.
99. See infra Part IV.E.1.
100. The IPLC database, which was the primary source of cases for this study, contains
patent cases filed beginning January 1, 2000. Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse, supra
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which a joint or unopposed101 settlement-related102 motion for vacatur was filed and
decided103 between January 1, 2006, and January 3, 2011, where the motion
targeted at least one of the following four types of rulings: (1) claim construction,
(2) noninfringement, (3) invalidity, or (4) unenforceability. A total of 79 cases were
found.104
The subject matter of the rulings targeted for vacatur was limited to the four
listed above because of the public’s interest in removing the burdens on commerce
and competition imposed by patents that are invalid, unenforceable, or not
infringed. While there are other types of rulings for which settlement-related
vacatur might be requested, such as orders relating to remedies or sanctions, they
were not included in the dataset because their impact tends to be largely localized
to the parties and their counsel, rather than affecting the patent itself.
In other words, the subject-matter restriction for the dataset focuses on whether
the patentee seeks to vacate a ruling that would somehow impair the extent to
which a patent may be repeatedly wielded against the public. In addition to
invalidity and unenforceability rulings, claim construction105 and noninfringement
rulings were included because they enhance the public notice function of a patent
by providing notice of which products may fall outside the scope of the claims.
Claim construction and noninfringement rulings are especially important where the
potential accused products in a given industry (1) comply with a technical standard
(e.g., any Wi-Fi-compatible device may infringe a patent covering the Wi-Fi
standard); (2) possess a material feature that is implemented in a substantially
similar manner across products made by different manufacturers (e.g., any
smartphone that unlocks when a user slides a finger across the touchscreen could
infringe a patent covering that interface feature); or (3) are essentially identical
(e.g., generic drugs).
In addition to subject matter constraints, the rulings were further restricted to
those that could potentially be accorded collateral estoppel effect. To this end, nonfinal, interlocutory rulings, such as claim constructions and partial summary
judgment rulings, were counted in addition to final judgments because non-final
note 8.
101. Settlement-related motions for vacatur that are actually opposed by one of the
settling parties are extremely rare. Such motions were not counted for this Article, which
focuses on the more common yet problematic situation where vacatur is requested and there
is no opposing voice, other than from a third-party objector.
102. The dataset excludes cases where the only item targeted is a ruling that warrants
vacatur on a ground independent from facilitating settlement. For example, if the sole item
listed in the vacatur motion is a judgment that warrants vacatur under Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(5) because the judgment was based on an earlier decision that has since been reversed
or vacated, then that case was not included in the dataset.
103. For completeness, cases in which the motion was subsequently withdrawn were also
included in the dataset.
104. The completeness of the dataset is necessarily limited by the completeness of the
data sources (IPLC, Westlaw, and Docket Navigator) and the search functions used to
compile the dataset.
105. In coding the dataset, a claim construction ruling that was targeted for vacatur was
presumed to contain at least one construction that the patentee perceived as unfavorable.
Further, it was assumed that a patentee would not agree to vacate a claim construction ruling
that it considered wholly beneficial.
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rulings have been accorded collateral estoppel effect in some cases.106 Also, the
rulings of noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability that were counted for
the purposes of the dataset were those “actually decided” on the merits, such as the
grant of an accused infringer’s motion for summary judgment (as opposed to a
denial of a motion).107 Claim construction rulings, which are pronouncements by
the court on the meaning of claim terms,108 were counted without regard to the
form in which they were delivered by the court (whether in a standalone order or in
a hearing transcript). Finally, the dataset does not include cases where the only item
targeted in the vacatur motion is a stipulated judgment entered solely to facilitate
appeal, because such stipulations are not usually deemed “actually litigated” for the
purpose of invoking collateral estoppel.109
With respect to temporal restrictions, the five-year time span of the vacatur
dataset—January 1, 2006 to January 3, 2011—was chosen to minimize any artifacts
in the results that might be introduced as a result of the limitations of the data
sources and changes in the relevant case law. Specifically, January 1, 2006, was
chosen as the starting date because: (1) the primary source of patent case data for
this empirical study, the IPLC, starts with cases that were filed in 2000,110 such that
beginning the dataset in 2006 would minimize any artifacts attributable to the
absence of any pre-2000 cases;111 (2) the Federal Circuit’s Dana decision with
Judge Dyk’s concurrence was issued in 2003;112 and (3) the Federal Circuit began

106. See, e.g., TM Patents L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 375–79 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (according collateral estoppel effect to claim construction order); see also Dana v. E.S.
Originals, Inc., 342 F.3d 1320, 1323–25 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying Eleventh Circuit law in
holding that partial summary judgment orders satisfied legal prerequisites for applying
collateral estoppel).
107. See, e.g., Kay-R Elec. Corp. v. Stone & Webster Constr. Co., 23 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir.
1994) (“[I]t is clear that for collateral estoppel to bar a party on an issue, the issue in dispute
must actually have been litigated and actually decided. . . . The denial of a motion for
summary judgment is not such.”).
108. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (holding that
“the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the
province of the court”).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 804 F.2d 116, 118 (8th Cir. 1986) (“A fact
established in prior litigation not by judicial resolution but by stipulation has not been
‘actually litigated’ and thus is the proper subject of proof in subsequent proceedings.”
(citation omitted)). The Federal Circuit further refined this rule in Hartley v. Mentor Corp.,
869 F.2d 1469, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1989), holding that, in determining whether issue preclusion
may arise from a stipulated judgment, “the primary consideration is the intent of the parties.”
110. See supra note 100.
111. That is, the vacatur dataset would not include any pre-2000 cases that were pending
on or after January 1, 2006. The number of omitted pre-2000 cases having a settlementrelated motion for vacatur that would satisfy both the subject matter and time period
restrictions for the vacatur dataset is expected to be negligible because patent cases pending
longer than six years are outliers. For example, out of the 1756 cases filed in 1997, only 66
(4%) had a duration of five or more years. Kesan & Ball, supra note 11, at 282, tbl.11.
Similarly, out of the 2081 cases filed in 2000, only 62 (2.5%) were pending on February 15,
2006. Id. at 282, tbl.11, n.253.
112. Dana v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 342 F.3d 1320, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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its Appellate Mediation Program in late 2005.113 As for the end date of the dataset,
January 3, 2011, was chosen because the Federal Circuit issued its precedential
Ohio Willow Wood “limited remand” order on January 4, 2011, such that limiting
the vacatur dataset to filings and rulings on or before January 3, 2011, would allow
the data to be analyzed without the need to factor in the influence, if any, of that
order or Judge Moore’s concurrence.114
The 79 district court cases115 in the dataset were identified primarily using the
IPLC, supplemented with searches in Westlaw and Docket Navigator.116 The IPLC
allows Boolean searching of individual docket entries,117 as well as certain case
documents—primarily complaints, opinions, orders, and judgments. A
supplemental search was also performed in Westlaw,118 which has a collection of
searchable civil trial filings. As a further check, a search was performed on Docket
Navigator, which contains a substantial collection of searchable district court orders
in the more recent cases.119
Sources of underinclusiveness in the dataset include the failure to discover cases
where the settlement-related vacatur motion was filed under seal with
uninformative docket text, and the resulting ruling by the court does not reveal the
nature of the relief requested in the sealed motion (such as where the ruling refers
to the motion only by the docket number). Similarly, if the motion was presented
informally or off-the-record at a hearing or at a conference—and the court provided
only an oral ruling—then such cases would have been missed as well. Where both
the motion and the court’s ruling are obscured from the public in this manner, it is
likely that vacatur was denied rather than granted, because the fact that a docket
item has been vacated would need to be made clear in the public record. As a result,

113. Appellate Mediation Program Guidelines, supra note 87 (“The United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit established an appellate mediation program pursuant to
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, which commenced on October 3, 2005.”).
114. Because the Ohio Willow Wood order does not address the merits of the vacatur
motion, see Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., 629 F.3d 1374, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2011), and Judge Moore’s concurrence is not binding precedent, see id. at 1375–76
(Newman, J., additional views), the practice of settlement-related vacatur in district court
patent cases is unlikely to dramatically change on or after January 4, 2011, in the absence of
a precedential Federal Circuit decision evaluating the merits of a district court’s ruling on a
motion for settlement-related vacatur. Nevertheless, the Ohio Willow Wood case may prompt
some district courts to analyze settlement-related vacatur motions more closely, and the
empirical study presented in this Article endeavors to provide information that might be
helpful in evaluating the appropriateness of granting vacatur in a given case.
115. Transferred cases and consolidated cases were counted only once. For consolidated
cases, a single “representative” case was coded for the group, where the case chosen for
coding was the oldest case that served as the primary docket (usually the “lead” case)
involving any of the patents that would benefit from the grant of vacatur.
116. Out of the 79 cases in the dataset, 74 were found using the IPLC and 5 were found
using Westlaw. After the IPLC and Westlaw searches, a further search was also performed
on Docket Navigator; no additional cases were found on Docket Navigator that were not
previously discovered.
117. Appendix A provides details of the searches performed on the IPLC.
118. Appendix B provides details of the searches performed on Westlaw.
119. Appendix C provides details of the searches performed on Docket Navigator.
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the risk of undercounting is greater for the cases in which vacatur was denied than
in the cases in which it was granted.
IV. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
For the 79 cases in the dataset, motions for vacatur were granted in 62 cases
(78.5%),120 denied in 15 cases (19%), and withdrawn by the parties in 2 cases
(2.5%).121
A. Profile of Rulings Targeted for Vacatur
1. Subject Matter and Form of Issuance
Table 1 tallies the number of cases in the dataset where the vacatur motion
targeted at least one of the four types of rulings affecting patent scope, validity, or
enforceability:
Table 1: Rulings Targeted for Vacatur
Substance of Ruling

Number
of Cases

% of Cases
(out of 79)

Claim Construction

40

50.6%

Noninfringement

32

40.5%

Invalidity

25

31.6%

Unenforceability

5

6.3%

In Table 1, the total number of cases (and therefore the percentage) exceeds 79
(or 100%) because a vacatur motion in a given case may target more than one type
of ruling. To be clear, the numbers in Table 1 do not list the absolute number of
rulings targeted; rather, Table 1 lists the number of cases in which the vacatur
motion targets a specific type of ruling. For example, if the vacatur motion in a
single case targets three separate rulings of noninfringement for different sets of
patents, the contribution of that case to Table 1 is to increment the
“Noninfringement” row by one, not three. By counting the number of cases rather
than the absolute number of rulings targeted for vacatur, the larger, complex cases
with multiple rulings are not disproportionally represented in the dataset.

120. This includes 2 cases in which the parties and the court attempted to achieve the
substantive effect of vacatur—namely, the elimination of any potential collateral estoppel
effect—by having the court issue an order declaring that the ruling was limited to that case.
For the purpose of reporting data and statistical analysis, these cases were counted as
instances in which vacatur was granted.
121. In the 2 cases where the parties withdrew their motions, the parties subsequently
settled.

2013]

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

939

That claim construction rulings122 were targeted for vacatur in approximately
half of the cases in the dataset (50.6%; 40 out of 79 cases) appears to reflect their
dispositive role in determining patent liability issues.123 Indeed, a claim
construction ruling was the sole item targeted for vacatur in 31.6% of the cases in
the dataset (25 out of 79 cases). The targeting of claim construction rulings for
vacatur is noteworthy because the extent to which they may be accorded collateral
estoppel effect remains unsettled: the Federal Circuit currently applies regional
circuit law governing collateral estoppel to evaluate the preclusive effect of claim
construction rulings,124 and has not yet considered the issue directly on the merits
as a matter of Federal Circuit law.125 In addition, some district courts have accorded
collateral estoppel effect to claim construction rulings,126 while others have not.127

122. Because claim constructions often underlie, and are incorporated into, rulings on
patent liability issues (such as noninfringement), claim construction rulings were counted as
a distinct item for vacatur only if the motion made clear that it was the sole reason a specific
ruling or docket item was being targeted for vacatur. For example, if a case does not have a
standalone claim construction order, and the vacatur motion targets a ruling granting
summary judgment of noninfringement that construes several claim terms as part of its
analysis, the motion was coded as targeting a noninfringement ruling only. Conversely, if a
standalone claim construction order contained a ruling that a claim term was indefinite, it
was coded only as a claim construction ruling and not also as an invalidity ruling.
123. See PETER S. MENELL, LYNN H. PASAHOW, JAMES POOLEY & MATTHEW D. POWERS,
PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 2–6 (2009), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1328659 (“[T]he structure and operation of an
accused device is often undisputed, so that determination of infringement will collapse into a
question of claim construction. . . . Claim construction is the foundation for analysis of both
infringement (has the patentee claimed broadly enough?) and invalidity (has the patentee
claimed too much?).” (citation omitted)).
124. See, e.g., RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pac. Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1260–61
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (analyzing Eleventh Circuit law and denying application of collateral
estoppel to claim construction ruling).
125. Whether a claim construction ruling may be accorded collateral estoppel effect is an
issue for which at least two petitions for interlocutory appeal were filed in recent years. In
2009, the Federal Circuit granted a petition for interlocutory appeal on this issue. See Shire
LLC v. Sandoz, Inc., 345 F. App’x 535, 535 (Fed. Cir. 2009). However, the parties settled
shortly thereafter and dismissed the appeal. See Shire LLC v. Sandoz, Inc., 368 F. App’x 116
(Fed. Cir. 2009). In 2010, another petition for interlocutory review was filed, but the Federal
Circuit denied that petition. See ICU Med., Inc. v. Rymed Techs., Inc., 364 F. App’x 622,
623 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
126. See, e.g., TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(“[T]he results of the Markman hearing in the [prior] action were sufficiently ‘final’ to
permit application of collateral estoppel—even though the matter to which they were
necessary was never reduced to a final judgment after verdict.”); see also Edberg v. CPI—
The Alternative Supplier, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 190, 196 (D. Conn. 2001) (“[A]s the TM
Patents court noted, the mere fact that plaintiffs settled the prior case does not give this
Court’s prior [claim construction] rulings any less preclusive effect.”); Abbott Labs. v. Dey,
L.P., 110 F. Supp. 2d 667, 669–71 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (analyzing requirements for issue
preclusion and concluding that they were satisfied for purpose of according preclusive effect
to prior claim construction ruling).
127. See, e.g., Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 468–70
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In view of this uncertainty, the data suggest that patentees appear to be taking the
risk-averse route by seeking vacatur of claim construction rulings.
Turning to the noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability rulings, Table 2
provides a matrix of the substance of the ruling and its form of issuance. Each cell
lists the number of cases and its corresponding percentage of the dataset (out of 79
cases):128
Table 2: Rulings and Form of Issuance Targeted for Vacatur
(# of cases; % of dataset (79 cases))
Form of Issuance

Noninfringement

Invalidity

Unenforceability

Grant of Summary
Judgment

28 (35.4%)

21 (26.6%)

2 (2.5%)

Bench Trial

1 (1.3%)

0

2 (2.5%)

Jury Verdict

2 (2.5%)

3 (3.8%)

0

Grant of JMOL

1 (1.3%)

2 (2.5%)

1 (1.3%)

The column totals in Table 2 may exceed those of the rows in Table 1 because a
vacatur motion in a single case may target a specific type of ruling across different
forms of disposition. For example, if a vacatur motion targets a ruling granting
summary judgment of invalidity as well as a jury verdict containing a finding of
invalidity, they are counted separately in Table 2. As shown in Table 2, the most
common type of disposition targeted for vacatur is the grant of summary judgment
of noninfringement (35.4% of cases), followed by the grant of summary judgment
of invalidity (26.6% of cases). The frequency of each of the remaining types of
dispositions, many of which involve trials, is in the low single digits.
The data from Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the timing of settlements in cases
where settlement-related vacatur is requested may not be appreciably different from
that of the general population of patent cases that have progressed to a point where
the court has issued a substantive ruling regarding the merits of the case: settlement
discussions generally begin in earnest after the issuance of a claim construction
order or a ruling on a motion for summary judgment but before trial.129 Indeed, as
(W.D. Va. 2001) (denying collateral estoppel effect to claim construction order); see also
Graco Children’s Prods., Inc. v. Regalo Int’l, LLC, 77 F. Supp. 2d 660, 663 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(“[T]he [Supreme] Court in Markman did not guarantee that collateral estoppel would apply
in every case, and this Court will not extend the Supreme Court ruling to mean as much,
especially where, as here, the circumstances of the instant action require that a different
result be reached.”).
128. The entire vacatur dataset contains 79 cases, but Table 2, which specifically focuses
on the noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability rulings targeted for vacatur, does
not include the 25 cases in the dataset where the sole item targeted for vacatur was a claim
construction ruling.
129. Cf. MENELL ET AL., supra note 123 at 2-7 (“One argument in favor of early, separate
claim construction is that it may facilitate settlement. . . . [I]t may be fruitful to schedule a
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discussed in greater detail in Part IV.C, the average duration of the cases in the
vacatur dataset is similar to the average duration of the cases in the general
population where the court has reached the merits of the patent liability issues.130
2. Final Judgments Versus Interlocutory Orders
Twice as many motions for vacatur were filed before the entry of final judgment
than afterwards, as shown in Table 3:131
Table 3: Finality and Disposition of Vacatur Motions
Motion Filed Before
Final Judgment
N=50 (% of 50)

Motion Filed After
Final Judgment
N=25 (% of 25)

Vacatur Granted

41 (82%)

19 (76%)

Vacatur Denied

9 (18%)

6 (24%)

Disposition

Notably, motions to vacate interlocutory orders and final rulings were granted at
comparable rates (82% versus 76%) in the dataset.132 This result is somewhat
surprising because vacatur after the entry of final judgment under Rule 60(b)(6)
requires a showing of “extraordinary circumstances,”133 whereas a district court has
fewer restrictions in vacating an interlocutory order under Rule 54(b).134 That final

settlement conference to follow shortly after issuance of a claim construction order.”).
130. See infra Part IV.C.
131. This Table does not include 4 cases from the dataset: 2 cases where the parties
withdrew their vacatur motions, and 2 cases where the vacatur motion was filed after the
case was remanded upon completion of an appeal.
132. The difference in the grant rates is not statistically significant: using Fisher’s exact
test, the two-tailed p-value is 0.553. Fisher’s exact test is useful for significance testing
where the dataset is relatively small such that the Chi-square test may not return accurate
results. Rick Routledge, Fisher’s Exact Test, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOSTATISTICS 1961,
1961–62 (Peter Armitage & Theodore Colton eds., 2d ed. 2005), available at http://online
library.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/0470011815.b2a10020/full. The significance levels used
throughout this Article are as follows: if the p-value is less than 0.05 (5%), the result is
deemed statistically significant; if it is less than 0.01 (1%), the result is deemed highly
statistically significant. DAVID FREEDMAN, ROBERT PISANI & ROGER PURVES, STATISTICS 482
(4th ed. 2007). Two-tailed p-values are reported in this Article because it is more
conservative (that is, less likely to indicate statistical significance) than a one-tailed result.
See generally R. MARK SIRKIN, STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 210–12 (3d ed. 2006).
133. See supra notes 35 & 54. See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486
U.S. 847, 863–64 (1988) (observing that Rule 60(b)(6) “does not particularize the factors
that justify relief, but . . . it provides courts with authority ‘adequate to enable them to vacate
judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice,’ while also cautioning
that it should only be applied in ‘extraordinary circumstances’” (citations omitted)).
134. See, e.g., Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Insured Lloyd’s, 786 F.2d 1265, 1269 (5th
Cir. 1986) (“Not only is [an interlocutory] order not appealable, but it remains within the
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judgments are being vacated at a rate close to that of interlocutory orders suggests
that district courts are disproportionately prioritizing settlements over the public’s
interest in the finality of judgments and the preclusive value of precedent.
Moreover, the 82% grant rate of motions targeting interlocutory orders appears to
be a disproportionally high rate of “revising” a ruling under Rule 54(b): outside of
the context of settlement-related vacatur, district courts very rarely grant motions
for reconsideration that seek to amend an interlocutory ruling.135
In short, the high rate of granting vacatur for both interlocutory and final rulings
is a likely indication that district courts are elevating near-term docket management
concerns—which may be readily alleviated by settlement—over long-term judicial
economy and the public interest (particularly those of non-parties). This is a
recurring pattern in the data, as illustrated in the rest of Part IV.
3. Age of Rulings Targeted for Vacatur
The impact of vacatur on third parties and other proceedings is likely to be
greater the longer a ruling has remained in force. For example, if a ruling in one
case is based on according collateral estoppel effect to a prior ruling in a different
case, then the vacatur of that prior ruling could allow the patentee to seek vacatur of
the later ruling under Rule 60(b)(5).136 In addition to concurrent litigation, there
may be ripple effects in various non-judicial contexts, including proceedings at the
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office and arbitration.
Accordingly, data on the “age”137 of the rulings targeted for vacatur were
collected, as summarized in the table below:

plenary power of the district court to revise or set aside in its sound discretion without any
necessity to meet the requirements of Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b).”); see also Persistence Software,
Inc. v. Object People, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 626, 627 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“The standard for
granting a motion to vacate under Rule 54(b) is less rigid than that under Rule 60(b)
governing vacation of final judgments.”). But see Siemens Med. Sys., Inc. v. Nuclear
Cardiology Sys., Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1421, 1435 (D. Colo. 1996) (“Although Rule 54(b)
provides that an order that is not explicitly made final is subject to later revision, it would be
pedantic to contend that all interlocutory orders are therefore ‘tentative’ in any real sense.”).
135. 11 MOORE, supra note 35, at § 56.124[1] (“Motions for reconsideration of
interlocutory summary judgment rulings are rarely granted . . . .”).
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5) provides: “On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a
party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reason[]: . . . [If] the judgment . . . is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or
vacated . . . .” (emphasis added).
137. The age of the targeted ruling associated with each case was calculated as the
difference between the date on which the targeted ruling was issued and the date of the
vacatur motion. If there were multiple rulings targeted for vacatur in a single motion, the
date of the oldest ruling was used.
The date of the vacatur motion was coded as the first date on which the parties
moved for vacatur. In a few cases, more than one version of the vacatur motion was filed
because the parties were gauging the district court’s willingness to grant vacatur by initially
requesting an “indicative ruling” (under FED. R. CIV. P. 62.1) in connection with a potential
“limited remand” during appeal (under FED. R. APP. P. 12.1), and then filing a “formal”
vacatur motion on remand. In those cases, the date of the motion for the indicative ruling
was coded as the date of the vacatur motion because it was the first formal motion in the
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Table 4: Age of Rulings Targeted in Vacatur Motions (in days)
All Cases
in Dataset
N=79

Vacatur
Granted
N=62

Vacatur
Denied
N=15

Motion
Withdrawn
N=2

6 / 1219

6 / 1219

16 / 853

648 / 670

Average

329

339

242

659

Median

227

240

152

659

Std. Dev.

287

292

252

15.6

Range
(Low/High)

In the dataset, the average age of a ruling that was targeted for vacatur is 329
days (median: 227 days), which provides a substantial period of time for the ruling
to be discovered by third parties and cited in other proceedings. Although there
were too few cases where vacatur was denied (N=15) to allow a comparison of the
average ages for statistical significance,138 it is notable that the average age of the
targeted rulings where vacatur was denied (242 days; median: 152 days) is actually
shorter than the average age where vacatur was granted (339 days; median: 240
days). One possible explanation for this result is that a court might be disinclined to
vacate a substantive decision so soon after having invested considerable resources
in its preparation, whereas after the passage of time, the court may be more
receptive to granting vacatur as a result of “hedonic adaptation.”139
However, the longer the delay in vacating a ruling after its issuance, the greater
the likelihood of potential disruption to other proceedings—especially if the ruling
has been accorded collateral estoppel effect in another case. Indeed, the fact that
collateral estoppel was successfully invoked in a parallel proceeding may be one of
the reasons behind a patentee’s desire to seek vacatur of the prior ruling underlying
the invocation of collateral estoppel: once the prior ruling is vacated, the patentee
can then move under Rule 60(b)(5) to secure vacatur of the disposition in the
public record that put the court and any interested third parties on notice of the parties’ desire
for vacatur. In one case where the patentee filed two vacatur motions in close succession in
the course of settling with different defendants in a multi-defendant suit, only the first
vacatur motion was counted and coded because both vacatur motions targeted the same set
of substantive rulings.
138. A two-sample t-test is commonly used to compare the averages of two sets of data
for statistical significance. See generally SIRKIN, supra note 132, at 271–74. In order for the
t-test to produce reliable results, each constituent set should contain at least thirty
observations. Carmen R. Wilson VanVoorhis & Betsy L. Morgan, Understanding Power
and Rules of Thumb for Determining Sample Sizes, 3 TUTORIALS QUANTITATIVE METHODS
FOR PSYCHOL. 43, 48 tbl.3 (2007), available at http://www.tqmp.org/Content/vol032/p043/p043.pdf.
139. “Hedonic adaptation” refers to the tendency to return to a baseline emotional state
after a positive or a negative experience. Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic
Adaptation, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 302, 302 (Daniel
Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert Schwarz eds., 1999) (“Hedonic adaptation refers to a
reduction in the affective intensity of favorable and unfavorable circumstances.”).
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parallel proceeding that resulted from the application of collateral estoppel.140 In
this manner, the patentee can strip from a court in a concurrent case the efficiency
gains from having applied collateral estoppel, so as to place that court in a position
where it may need to readjudicate the same issues. Accordingly, a court can
minimize the prejudice to third parties and other courts by denying vacatur based
on the “age” of the ruling targeted for vacatur, or if there is a concurrent proceeding
involving the same patent.
B. Manner of Disposition of Vacatur Motion
When ruling on vacatur motions, courts generally granted or denied the motion
as a whole, even though the nature and scope of the relief sought in the 79 vacatur
motions varied in type and number. The number of docket items targeted for
vacatur in a given motion ranged from 1 to 20, with an average of 2 docket items
targeted per motion. A vacatur motion will often target multiple items on the
docket because the patentee will seek to vacate not only a specific ruling, but also
any related items. For example, if a patentee desires to eliminate any preclusive
effect associated with a noninfringement ruling, the motion might list not only the
associated memorandum opinion granting summary judgment of noninfringement,
but also the minute order of the hearing during which the court provided a tentative
ruling, the opinion denying the patentee’s motion for reconsideration, and the entry
of judgment in favor of the accused infringer based on the noninfringement ruling.
Furthermore, in 11 out of 79 cases (13.9%), the vacatur motions also targeted
affirmative rulings141 that were adverse to the accused infringer on an issue of
patent liability, in addition to the items that the patentee targeted.
A comparison between the relief requested in the motion for vacatur and the
court’s ruling on the motion was possible in 73 out of the 79 cases in the dataset:142

140. For example, in CollegeNET, Inc. v. XAP Corp., No. 3:03-cv-01229-BR (D. Or.),
the patentee, CollegeNET, moved for settlement-related vacatur of an invalidity judgment
that had been accorded collateral estoppel effect in a concurrent case, CollegeNET, Inc. v.
ApplyYourself, Inc., No. 3:02-cv-00484-HU (D. Or.). Opinion and Order at 2–6,
CollegeNET, Inc. v. XAP Corp., No. 3:03-cv-01229-BR (D. Or. June 8, 2009), ECF No.
927. After the XAP court granted vacatur, id. at 2, the patentee filed a Rule 60(b)(5) motion
in the ApplyYourself case to vacate an order granting summary judgment of invalidity on the
ground that it relied on the now-vacated XAP judgment. Memorandum in Support of
Unopposed Renewed Motion to Vacate Interlocutory Order Granting Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment of Invalidity Based on Collateral Estoppel and to Enter Agreed
Consent Judgment at 2, CollegeNET, Inc. v. ApplyYourself, Inc., No. 3:02-cv-00484-HU
(D. Or. June 10, 2009), ECF No. 741. The ApplyYourself court granted the Rule 60(b)(5)
motion. Order at 2-3, CollegeNET, Inc. v. ApplyYourself, Inc., No. 3:02-cv-00484-HU
(D. Or. June 12, 2009), ECF No. 743.
141. By “affirmative ruling,” the author refers to a disposition granting (rather than
denying) a motion, a jury verdict, or the entry of judgment.
142. In 6 cases, a comparison could not be made: in 2 cases, the parties withdrew their
vacatur motion; and in 4 cases, a written motion was not filed prior to the court’s ruling,
such that it could not be determined whether the court modified the relief sought. (There
were a total of 6 cases in which a written motion was not formally filed, but in 2 of those
cases, it was possible to ascertain that the court did not modify the relief sought because the
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the court denied the motion as a whole in 15 cases, granted the motion in full
without modification in 55 cases, and granted the motion with modifications in 3
cases. In 2 of the 3 cases where the relief requested was modified, the court’s ruling
actually increased the number of items vacated,143 and in the remaining case, the
court provided a substitute form of relief by limiting the effect of the targeted
ruling to the case so as to achieve the effect of vacatur in extinguishing any
preclusive effect of the targeted ruling beyond the case.144 In short, of the 58 cases
where the ruling granting vacatur (or its equivalent) could be compared with the
original relief sought in the motion, the court granted less than the original relief
requested, albeit slightly, in only a single case.
Furthermore, when courts decided vacatur motions, they often did so without
issuing a fully reasoned opinion explaining the decision to grant or deny vacatur, as
shown in Table 5 below:
Table 5: Manner of Disposition of Vacatur Motions145
Vacatur
Granted
N=62

Vacatur
Denied
N=15

Proposed order adopted without material changes

34

0

Proposed order modified

1146

3147

[Proposed order not used] Ruling did not contain
substantive explanation or analysis

17

5

[Proposed order not used] Ruling contained
substantive explanation or analysis

10

7

Manner of Disposition

When granting vacatur, district courts provided a substantive,148 reasoned
opinion in only 16.1% of cases (10 out of 62 grants). Even where the settlementrelated vacatur motion was filed after the entry of final judgment—which requires a
showing of “extraordinary circumstances” under Rule 60(b)(6)149—courts provided
substantive explanations in only 4 out of 19 cases (21.1%) where vacatur was
court’s order was the parties’ proposed order, signed without substantive modification.)
143. In these cases, the court’s ruling included additional related docket items for
vacatur, such as a prior version of the targeted ruling, a related minute order, and an order
entering judgment that was based on the targeted ruling. The supplementation appears to
have been made in furtherance of the relief requested by vacating all vestiges of the targeted
ruling and its effects. It is unknown whether the court added the related items sua sponte or
had been informally asked to do so by the parties after the motion was filed.
144. In coding the dataset, this was counted as a grant of vacatur.
145. This table does not include the 2 cases where the vacatur motion was withdrawn.
146. The court changed the request for vacatur to a request to limit the ruling to the case,
which has the substantive effect of vacatur.
147. In these cases, the court converted the proposed order to one that denied vacatur,
such as by replacing the word “grant” with “deny” or striking relevant parts.
148. In coding the dataset, a ruling contained “substantive” analysis if it went beyond a
conclusory statement on the appropriateness of the ruling.
149. See supra notes 35 & 54.

946

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:919

granted after final judgment. By contrast, when vacatur was denied, the court
issued a substantive ruling 46.7% of the time (7 out of 15 denials). This disparity in
the rate of courts providing substantive explanations when granting versus denying
vacatur (16.1% versus 46.7%) is statistically significant.150
This is basically the inverse of the scenario contemplated by Bancorp, which
provides that the grant of vacatur based on settlement is deemed an “extraordinary
remedy” that is justified only under “exceptional circumstances.”151 Indeed, the
data suggest that district courts are effectively treating the denial of vacatur as the
exceptional case that warrants reasoned justification. One possible explanation for
this result may be that the primary audience for a substantive opinion setting forth
the bases for denying vacatur may be the appellate court in the event the parties
appeal (or resume their appeal after a “limited remand”), so as to provide additional
context of the circumstances under which the parties are seeking appellate
review.152
Unfortunately, there are too few cases in the dataset from which to draw any
firm conclusions as to whether the Federal Circuit might accord greater deference
to the district court’s judgment when an appeal is prompted by the district court’s
reasoned refusal to vacate. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that only 2 cases in the
dataset were appealed after vacatur was denied, and both of those denials were
delivered through substantive opinions; on appeal, neither case resulted in a
reversal or a remand.153 In addition, when the district court in Ohio Willow Wood
denied vacatur during the limited remand, it explained its denial in a thoroughlyreasoned opinion; when the appeal resumed, the Federal Circuit summarily
affirmed the judgment.154 Although these three cases may not necessarily denote a
trend, they do provide a starting point for future research.
C. Vacatur and Case Duration
In Bancorp, the Supreme Court observed that settlement-related vacatur “may
deter settlement at an earlier stage” whereby “[s]ome litigants, at least, may think it
worthwhile to roll the dice rather than settle . . . if, but only if, an unfavorable
outcome can be washed away by a settlement-related vacatur.”155 However, at the

150. Using Fisher’s exact test, the two-tailed p-value is 0.017.
151. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
152. See Hoffman et al., supra note 18, at 703–04 (“When reversing trial court work,
appellate judges often comment on the lack of a written opinion. . . . Although empirical
evidence on whether opinions reduce reversal rates is at best ambiguous, it is possible that
trial judges believe that writing can protect them from shame.” (footnotes omitted)).
153. In one case, the parties eventually dismissed the appeal. Order at 1, Allan Block
Corp. v. Cnty. Materials Corp., No. 0:05-cv-02879-JNE-JJG (D. Minn. Mar. 15, 2010), ECF
No. 462. In the other case, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment. Judgment at 1, Avid
Identification Sys., Inc. v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No. 2:04-cv-00183-TJW (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 2, 2010), ECF No. 483 (on appeal, the case was docketed as Avid Identification Sys.,
Inc. v. Crystal Imp. Corp.).
154. See supra note 78. See Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d
1065, 1066–71 (E.D. Tex. 2011), aff’d, 440 F. App’x 926, 926 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
155. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 28 (1994) (emphasis
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district court level, the data suggest that settlement-related vacatur does not appear
to substantially affect the timing of settlements156 or case duration;157 rather, it
appears to function primarily as a bargaining chip during settlement negotiations.158
Indeed, the average case duration in the vacatur dataset is comparable to the
average duration in the general population of patent cases where the court had
reached the merits of the patent liability issues.159 Furthermore, the average
duration of the cases in the dataset where vacatur was granted is similar to that of
the cases where vacatur was denied.160
In compiling the statistics for case duration, the time to termination was coded
so that it reflected the actual duration of litigation between the parties—from the
filing of the complaint to the termination of litigation in the district court through
appeal, if any. As a result, the litigation termination date used to calculate the
lawsuit duration for this empirical study may be different from the “termination
date” listed in PACER, which may not always account for the time spent on postjudgment litigation or appeals.161 In coding the dataset, the date of litigation
termination used in calculating the case duration was the date on which litigation
ceased at both the trial and appellate levels between the parties that moved for
vacatur, as determined as follows:
(1)

The termination date is the date of the following items, whichever
is later: (i) final district court order disposing of the merits and
any collateral issues (such as fees and costs), (ii) consent
judgment, (iii) stipulated dismissal (filed in district court), (iv)
notice of satisfaction of judgment, or (v) Federal Circuit mandate.

(2)

If there are multiple parties and the vacatur motion is brought in
connection with a settlement between the patentee and a subset of
the accused infringers, the termination date is the date on which
litigation terminates between the settling parties and is
determined using the criteria set forth in paragraph (1).162

(3)

The time to termination does not include the litigation between
the patentee and any third-party objector to the vacatur motion
(such as an intervenor) that continues after the termination of
litigation between the parties that moved for vacatur.

The table below summarizes the time to termination for the cases in the dataset:

in original).
156. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
157. See infra Table 7.
158. See infra Table 7 and note 173.
159. See infra Table 7.
160. See infra Table 7.
161. If the PACER termination date is used, the average case duration for the dataset
decreases by 96 days. See infra note 163.
162. This occurred in 3 out of 79 cases, where the patentee moved to vacate certain
rulings associated with a specific party with whom the patentee planned to settle, while still
actively litigating against the non-settling parties. The court granted vacatur in those 3 cases.
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Table 6: Time Between Filing of Complaint to
Termination of Litigation in Dataset (in days)
All Cases
in Dataset
N=79

Vacatur
Granted
N=62

Vacatur
Denied
N=15

Motion
Withdrawn
N=2

225 / 3737

225 / 3737

322 / 2275

1399 / 2277

Average

1272

1246

1304

1838

Median

1145

1136

1084

1838

Std. Dev.

661

687

547

621

Range
(Low/High)

The time to termination of the 79 cases in the vacatur dataset ranged from 225
days to 3737 days, with an average of 1272 days (median: 1145 days).163 Although
there were too few cases where vacatur was denied (N=15) to allow a comparison
of the average durations for statistical significance,164 it is nevertheless notable that
there is hardly any difference in the average (and median) termination times as a
function of disposition: the granted cases have a slightly shorter average duration
by 58 days (1246 days versus 1304 days), while their median duration is slightly
longer than that of the denied cases by 52 days (1136 days versus 1084 days). The
similarity in the average durations raised another question for investigation: if the
average duration is not affected by the disposition of the vacatur motion, could it,
instead, be affected by the fact that vacatur was requested? In other words, if the
patentee filed a vacatur motion, would it mean that the patentee had taken a waitand-see approach that unduly prolonged litigation? As discussed below, the answer
appears to be “no.”165
By way of comparison, the average duration of a patent case in the general
population is approximately 15 months, or 450 days,166 which is a fraction of the
average duration for the vacatur dataset (1272 days). However, this disparity

163. By way of comparison, if the PACER termination date is used, the average case
duration is 1176 days, which is 96 days less than the average case duration (1272 days)
calculated using the specific criteria formulated for the empirical study to account for
appeals and post-judgment litigation. In calculating the PACER average, 3 cases were
excluded because the grant of vacatur resulted in the termination of the litigation only as to a
subset of the settling parties, such that the PACER termination date would not reflect the
termination of the litigation specifically as to the settling parties.
164. See supra note 138.
165. See infra notes 169–176 and accompanying text.
166. In a study of patent cases filed in 1995, 1997, and 2000, the average number of days
to termination was 418 days, 466 days, and 443 days, respectively. Kesan & Ball, supra note
11, at 281–82. In a study of 2300 cases filed between January 2000 and March 2008
involving high-tech patents (that is, those covering hardware, software, and financial
inventions), the average suit duration was less than 15 months. Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls,
Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech
Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1593, 1595, 1605 tbl.6 (2009).
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reflects the substantial proportion of patent cases in the general population that are
terminated shortly after filing or on procedural grounds without reaching the
merits.167
Accordingly, for a more meaningful comparison of case-duration times, a
“control” sample was compiled of 100 district court patent cases selected at random
from a subset of the general population168 where the court reached the merits of the
patent liability issues, as indicated by the issuance of, at a minimum, (i) a claim
construction ruling, or (ii) a ruling (this includes minute orders and rulings denying
summary judgment) addressing the merits of the parties’ theories relating to
infringement, validity, or enforceability. To minimize potential temporal bias, the
control cases, like the vacatur dataset, were selected from the IPLC, and the
termination dates of the control cases were restricted to the same time frame in
which the vacatur motions were filed and decided (that is, January 1, 2006 to
January 3, 2011), with the termination dates determined using the same criteria
described earlier in this section for the vacatur dataset. However, the control sample
was designed to differ from the dataset in one key aspect: a settlement-related
motion for vacatur (of any type of ruling) was not filed in any of the 100 control
cases.
The table below compares the case duration of the control sample with the
vacatur dataset.

167. Indeed, a substantial percentage of patent cases terminate with hardly any docket
activity. See, e.g., Kesan & Ball, supra note 11, at 285 tbl.12 (reporting that 43% of patent
cases filed in 1995, 46% in 1997, and 43% in 2000 terminated with less than 20 documents
filed). The first twenty documents in a patent case docket are typically the complaint, the
answer, motions for extensions of time to file responsive pleadings, the summons, various
administrative orders, corporate disclosure statements, notices of attorney appearance, pro
hac vice motions, the scheduling order, and other prefatory filings. Only a minority of cases
reach the summary judgment briefing stage. Id. at 287 (observing that motions for summary
judgment were filed in 27% of patent cases filed in 1997 and in 24% of cases filed in 2000).
168. Cases were randomly selected using the IPLC until 100 cases were collected that fit
the substance and timing criteria for the “control” sample. The following types of cases were
excluded: (i) cases terminated based on default judgments or for want of prosecution, (ii)
cases indefinitely stayed because of reexamination or bankruptcy, (iii) cases dismissed on
procedural grounds (such as standing, jurisdiction, sufficiency of pleading), and (iv) cases
where a settlement-related motion for vacatur (of any kind) was filed. To prevent doublecounting, transferred cases were counted only when the case associated with the transferee
court was selected randomly, and consolidated cases were counted only if the lead case was
selected randomly. Some consolidated cases (which include multi-jurisdictional litigation)
can have numerous member cases, such that a single termination date for analytical purposes
often cannot be suitably chosen; accordingly, consolidated cases involving more than five
total member cases were excluded. Five was chosen as the limit for the size of the
consolidated cases in the control sample because it corresponds to the size of the largest
consolidated case in the vacatur dataset.
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Table 7: Case Duration: Control Sample and Vacatur Dataset (in days)
Control
Sample
N=100

All Cases
in Dataset
N=79

Vacatur
Granted
N=62

Vacatur
Denied
N=15

Motion
Withdrawn
N=2

132 / 3389

225 / 3737

225 / 3737

322 / 2275

1399 / 2277

Average

1218

1272

1246

1304

1838

Median

980

1145

1136

1084

1838

Std. Dev.

692

661

687

547

621

Range
(Low/High)

The respective average durations of the control sample (1218 days)169 and that
of the vacatur dataset (1272 days) differ by only 54 days; this difference is not
statistically significant.170 Notably, the percentage of cases in the control sample
that involved an appeal171 (45%; 45 out of 100 cases) was higher than that of the
vacatur dataset (34.2%; 27 out of 79 cases).172 This result was expected because the
parties are essentially treating vacatur as an alternative to appeal.
The similarity in the average case duration between the control sample and the
vacatur dataset suggests that at least at the district court level, the patentee’s desire
for settlement-related vacatur does not appear to be the primary motivating force
behind when the parties begin settlement discussions. Instead, it is more likely that
vacatur motions are filed as a result of their use as bargaining chips173 during
settlement negotiations. That is, for the cases in the dataset, settlement-related
vacatur appears to influence the price of settlements more than their timing.

169. For this sample of 100 control cases, the 95% confidence interval for the average
duration is 1081 to 1355 days, and the margin of error, which is one-half of the confidence
interval, is +137 days. If the PACER termination date is used, the average case duration for
the control cases would be 1055 days, which is 163 days less than the average case duration
(1218 days) calculated using the specific criteria formulated for the empirical study to
account for appeals and post-judgment litigation.
170. Using a two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances and unpaired values, the twotailed p-value is 0.5929.
171. A case was coded as “appealed” if the parties filed a notice of appeal at any point in
the litigation. Writs of mandamus and notices of appeal filed by non-parties (such as
potential intervenors) were not counted.
172. This difference is not statistically significant. Using Fisher’s exact test, the twotailed p-value is 0.168. See supra note 132.
173. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for
Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1471, 1491 (1994) [hereinafter Resnik, Whose Judgment?] (“When the judicial opinion
becomes available as a ‘bargaining chip,’ the purchasing power of litigants grows.” (footnote
omitted)); see also Fisch, supra note 2, at 641 (“[A] prevailing litigant may be the
beneficiary of the bargaining advantage afforded . . . by the additional costs the judgment
imposes on the other side. A well-informed litigant should be able to negotiate a higher
postjudgment settlement if he agrees to vacatur as a condition of settlement.”).
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More generally, the type of “roll the dice” litigation strategy criticized in
Bancorp174 cannot be successfully executed unless the patentee can be certain—
prior to the issuance of a potentially adverse decision—that the court will actually
grant vacatur upon request.175 Accordingly, in view of the denial rate of 19% (15
out of 79 cases) in the dataset, it is unlikely that patentees can confidently engage
in a “roll the dice” litigation strategy based on the prospect of having the court
vacate any inconvenient rulings. Furthermore, because a critical trait of a successful
motion for vacatur at the district court level is the absence of opposition, a patentee
may not know whether moving for vacatur is a feasible option until the case is at
the settlement stage, where it may be suggested for the first time by a mediator176
and the opposing party does not object.
However, with the increasing sophistication of legal informatics and granular
docket information available to litigants (such as the IPLC and Docket
Navigator),177 it may be possible in the near future for patentees to systematically
analyze and accurately discern the case conditions (such as court/judge, accused
infringer, opposing counsel) under which motions for settlement-related vacatur
have a high likelihood of being granted. Repeat litigants could use such information
to steer cases to certain courts or judges who are known to reliably grant vacatur,
which could render “rolling the dice” a viable litigation strategy in some cases.
Accordingly, from the standpoint of judicial economy, it may be beneficial for
judges to deny settlement-related vacatur so as to avoid developing a reputation for
granting them.
D. Vacatur as a Condition of Settlement
One of the concerns a court may have with a motion for vacatur is whether
settlement may not occur, or whether a recent settlement may break down (prior to
the deadline for reopening a terminated case)178 if vacatur were denied. In a
majority of cases (67.1%; 53 out of 79), the motions did not expressly state that
settlement was contingent on the grant of vacatur. However, in a sizeable minority
of cases (22.8%; 18 out of 79) the motions did include an express representation of

174. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 155 and accompanying text; see also Fisch, supra note 2, at 596
(“[I]f a litigant is certain that the court will subsequently vacate an adverse judgment, the
availability of vacatur makes going to trial cost-free, apart from litigation costs.” (footnotes
omitted)). Thus, it is only under a regime that grants settlement-related vacatur motions
nearly automatically that a party’s desire to “roll the dice” may be the primary influence on
case duration.
176. See, e.g., Mark D. DeBofsky, Mediating in the Appellate Court, 34 LITIG. 47, 51
(2008) (“[A]s long as the lower court is willing to go along, many mediators use the
possibility of vacatur as a settlement tool.” (emphasis in original)).
177. See supra notes 8–9.
178. In some cases, a district court will provide a window during which settling parties
may reopen a case after termination in the event the settlement fails. See, e.g., Cupid
Founds., Inc. v. Jupi Corp., No. 2:07-cv-05506-JLL-CCC (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2010), ECF No. 83
(providing sixty-day window). In 6.3% of the cases in the dataset (5 out of 79), the vacatur
motion was filed after the date on which litigation terminated.
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conditionality. The 67.1% and 22.8% figures are lower bounds because the motions
in the remaining 10.1% of the cases (8 out of 79) were not accessible because they
were filed under seal or no formal motion was filed. Table 8 tallies the disposition
of the vacatur motions as a function of any statements of conditionality.179
Table 8: Conditionality Statements and Disposition of
Vacatur Motions (# of cases)
No statement in
Motion conditioning
settlement on grant
N=53 (% of 53)

Motion stated that
settlement was
conditioned on grant
N=18 (% of 18)

Motion Inaccessible
(sealed or not filed)
N=8 (% of 8)

Granted

37 (69.8%)

18 (100%)

7 (87.5%)

Denied

15 (28.3%)

0

0

1 (1.9%)

0

1 (12.5%)

Disposition

Motion
Withdrawn

In the dataset, courts denied vacatur only when the motion did not contain a
statement that the settlement was conditioned on its grant. In contrast, when the
motion contained a statement of conditionality, it was granted in every case. The
difference in the grant rate as a function of whether the vacatur motion contained an
express statement of conditionality (69.8%, not conditioned, versus 100%,
conditioned) is highly statistically significant.180
Based on these results, it may be possible for a patentee to effectively guarantee
vacatur by representing to the court that the settlement is conditioned on its grant.
That such contingencies are not more common, as illustrated by the majority of the
cases in the dataset (67.1%; 53 out of 79) having motions that do not contain a
statement of conditionality, suggests that accused infringers are often unwilling to
condition settlement on vacatur, and instead prefer to limit their support of any
vacatur motion to non-opposition. From the standpoint of judicial economy,
however, if district courts were to automatically grant vacatur so long as it was an
express condition of settlement, it may have the perverse effect of rewarding
patentees who delay settlement until the litigation progresses to a point where the
patentee has essentially worn down the accused infringer, who might then agree to

179. The conditionality variable was coded “yes” only if the motion expressly stated that
the grant of vacatur was a condition of settlement. The coding was based on the contents of
the motion, and any briefs or memoranda filed in support, but not any attached exhibits, such
as settlement agreements, which were usually filed under seal. It was assumed that if the
parties did intend for the settlement to be contingent on the grant of vacatur, it would be a
material fact that would have been highlighted in the motion itself.
180. Counting only the 71 “accessible” motions, the two-tailed p-value using Fisher’s
exact test is 0.007. If all 8 “inaccessible” motions contained statements of conditionality,
then Fisher’s exact test would return a two-tailed p-value of 0.008. Conversely, if all 8
“inaccessible” motions did not contain any statements of conditionality, then Fisher’s exact
test would return a two-tailed p-value of 0.009.
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the patentee’s demand to condition the settlement on the grant of vacatur. As
discussed in the previous section, a “roll the dice” litigation strategy that delays
settlement could result if there is a condition under which vacatur is effectively
guaranteed.181 By denying vacatur even when the settlement agreement is
contingent on it, district courts may guard themselves against such tactics.
Furthermore, if the denial of vacatur prompts the parties to actively litigate through
appeal, allowing the litigation to run its course may ultimately provide greater
benefits for judicial economy and the public interest because it will lead to a final
disposition that will lend a degree of certainty on issues affecting patent scope,
validity, or enforceability. Greater certainty on patent liability issues may result in a
net decrease in litigation, whereas continued uncertainty may have the opposite
effect.182
If the vacatur motion does not contain an express representation that the
settlement is conditioned on vacatur, the data suggest that its denial is unlikely to
jeopardize settlement: in each of the 15 cases where the court denied vacatur, the
settlement remained intact. However, the existence of a settlement may not always
end litigation. Although the settlement itself may not be contingent on vacatur,
denial may nevertheless result in continued litigation by the patentee—unopposed.
This happened in 2 out of the 15 cases where vacatur was denied: litigation
continued whereby the patentee filed an unopposed appeal from the judgment (and
the subsidiary rulings) that it had unsuccessfully targeted for vacatur. Notably,
neither of these appeals resulted in a reversal or a remand: in one of the cases, the
parties eventually dismissed the appeal,183 and in the other case, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the judgment.184 Such unopposed appeals following the denial of vacatur,
are, in effect, an attempt by the patentee to have it both ways—a settlement as well
as an uncontested appeal. This practice could be readily curtailed by the Federal
Circuit through the rigorous application of the mootness doctrine to appeals
resulting from the denial of settlement-related vacatur by dismissing the appeal if
the accused infringer had settled with the patentee and chosen not to oppose the
appeal on the merits.185

181. See supra Part IV.C.
182. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1984) (“In litigation, as in gambling, agreement over the
outcome leads parties to drop out. . . . Where either the plaintiff or defendant has a
‘powerful’ case, settlement is more likely because the parties are less likely to disagree about
the outcome.”).
183. Order at 1, Allan Block Corp. v. Cnty. Materials Corp., No. 0:05-cv-02879-JNE-JJG
(D. Minn. Mar. 15, 2010), ECF No. 462.
184. Judgment at 1, Avid Identification Sys., Inc. v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No.
2:04-cv-00183-TJW (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2010), ECF No. 483 (on appeal, the case was
docketed as “Avid Identification Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Imp. Corp.”).
185. See, e.g., Aqua Marine Supply v. AIM Machining, Inc., 247 F.3d 1216, 1220 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (“While in some circumstances the opposing party’s lack of interest will not bar
adjudication on the merits, the outcome is different when the appellant is responsible for the
opposing party’s lack of continued interest, for example, as here by a settlement.” (internal
citation omitted)). But see Avid Identification Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Imp. Corp., 603 F.3d 967,
971–72 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A live controversy still exists because [the accused infringer]
remained free under the settlement agreement to oppose this appeal on the merits. That it
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E. Patent Characteristics, Vacatur, and Relitigation
1. Litigation History
If a patent186 has a history of being litigated, would a district court be more or
less likely to grant vacatur of an adverse ruling affecting that patent? Surprisingly,
the vacatur grant rate in cases involving a patent with a history of litigation is
similar to those cases where the patent has no such history,187 even though the
former have a much higher likelihood of being involved in future litigation.188
To analyze settlement-related vacatur in the context of a patent’s litigation
history, the author gathered the relevant data as follows: for each case in the
dataset, each docket item targeted in the vacatur motion was reviewed to determine
which patents would be affected by (that is, benefit from) the grant of vacatur, and
those patent numbers were entered into the IPLC search field to determine whether
those patents were asserted in other cases. In tallying the number of suits associated
with the patents189 for a given case in the dataset,190 transferred cases were counted
once. If the same patent was asserted in multiple cases that were later consolidated,
the individual member cases were counted separately. False marking cases were not
counted.
In over half of the cases in the dataset (54.4%; 43 out of 79 cases), the patentee
sought vacatur of rulings affecting patents with a history of litigation at the time the
vacatur motion was filed, which confirms the analysis in the academic literature
that repeat litigants are more likely to seek vacatur.191 The 43 cases (out of 79) in

chose not to submit a brief does not deprive this court of jurisdiction over the issues on
appeal.” (internal citation omitted)).
186. Throughout this Article, all references to “patents” associated with a case in the
dataset will refer to those patents that would be affected by (that is, benefit from) the grant of
vacatur, which may be a subset of the patents in a given case.
187. See infra Table 9.
188. See infra Tables 11a & 11b.
189. While it would have been ideal to compile the litigation history on a claim-by-claim
basis rather than on the patent as a whole, finding reliable claim information is difficult
because the identity of the asserted claims is usually not available in a public filing until the
parties prepare substantive briefs for claim construction or summary judgment, which will
not exist for cases that were filed recently or that terminated prior to the claim construction
briefing stage. In contrast, compiling the litigation history at the patent level can be
performed more reliably because the asserted patents are listed in the complaint or in the
answer (as counterclaims). Also, any lack of precision that may result from focusing on the
patent, as opposed to each individual claim, is mitigated by the fact that the rulings of
interest that are targeted for vacatur are generally those that may have collateral estoppel
effect, which may apply to unadjudicated claims so long as those claims present issues
identical to the ones that were adjudicated. See Bourns, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 486
(Ct. Cl. 1976). Bourns, as a decision issued by the Court of Claims, a predecessor court of
the Federal Circuit, is treated as Federal Circuit precedent. See South Corp. v. United States,
690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
190. If a case in the dataset has multiple patents that would benefit from the grant of
vacatur, the litigation histories of those patents were aggregated into a single set of statistics
associated with that specific case.
191. See, e.g., Resnik, Whose Judgment?, supra note 173, at 1488 (“The very existence
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the dataset that involve patents with a history of litigation may be classified into
three subtypes: (1) cases having patents that were involved in prior litigation,192 (2)
cases having patents that are being asserted in concurrent litigation,193 and (3) cases
having patents that were involved in prior litigation and are also being asserted in
concurrent litigation. The distribution of cases having patents falling under one of
these three subtypes is shown in the figure below.
Figure 1: Distribution of Cases in Dataset Involving Patents
Having One of Three Possible Types of Litigation History
(# of Cases and % of Dataset (out of 79 cases))

No Litigation
History: 36 (45.6%)

Concurrent
Litigation

Prior
Litigation
14
(17.7%)

18
(22.8%)

11
(13.9%)

In addition to eliminating any potential collateral estoppel effect of an adverse
ruling, a patentee may seek vacatur for a variety of reasons unrelated to litigation,
including, (i) protecting its position in extrajudicial proceedings (for example,
arbitration or proceedings in the Patent Office), (ii) initiating a licensing campaign
or maintaining the flow of payments from existing licensees,194 and (iii) using the
of a reported opinion might also be seen as an encumbrance, influencing behavior. One can
therefore assume that not all litigants care equally about the existence of recorded judicial
opinions and that repeat players are more likely than one-shotters to be proponents of
vacatur.”).
192. In coding the dataset, “prior” litigation was deemed to be any previous litigation
involving a patent that would benefit from the grant of vacatur that terminated prior to the
date of the vacatur motion.
193. In coding the dataset, “concurrent” litigation was deemed to be parallel litigation
involving a patent that would benefit from the grant of vacatur that was pending at the time
the vacatur motion was filed. Member cases in a consolidated action were counted as
“concurrent” litigation if, at the time they were initially filed (as separate suits), the same
patent was being asserted. The total number of cases with “concurrent” litigation includes
one case that had a concurrently-filed patent suit against the United States government in the
Court of Federal Claims, which was mentioned in the vacatur motion in that case. (When the
vacatur dataset was being compiled, the IPLC did not contain patent cases from the Court of
Federal Claims.) If a suit was filed after the date of the vacatur motion but before the court
ruled on it, such suits were coded as “concurrent.”
194. An unenforced, invalid patent helps to “maintain an illegitimate monopoly” for the
patent holder without having to bring suit. Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects
of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 103 (2006).
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patent as a “scarecrow,” to borrow a term from Learned Hand,195 in the supply
chain to dissuade potential and existing customers and suppliers from using or
supplying parts for competing products that allegedly infringe.196 As a result, the
impact of a patentee securing vacatur of an adverse decision may have substantial
effects on third parties beyond any potential effects on future district court
litigation. If a patent has a history of litigation, the non-litigation effects listed
above are likely to be greater than in cases where the patent has not been previously
asserted or if the patentee is not known to be litigious. Yet, the data suggest that
litigation history does not appear to be a substantial consideration when courts
decide vacatur motions, as shown below.
Table 9: Disposition of Vacatur Motion Based on
Litigation History of Patents (# of Cases)
No Litigation
History at Time of
Vacatur Motion
N=36 (% of 36)

Prior/Concurrent
Litigation at Time of
Vacatur Motion
N=43 (% of 43)

Vacatur Granted

30 (83.3%)

32 (74.4%)

Vacatur Denied

5 (13.9%)

10 (23.3%)

Motion Withdrawn

1 (2.8%)

1 (2.3%)

Disposition

There is no statistically significant difference in vacatur grant rates (83.3%
versus 74.4%) between cases involving patents having no history of litigation
compared to those that do.197 The similarity in grant rates further illustrates the
heavy bias of the courts toward facilitating settlement, despite the greater
likelihood of potential ripple effects in both litigation and non-litigation contexts
posed by patents with a history of litigation.
Indeed, even when the same patent was being litigated in parallel before a
different judge at the time the vacatur motion was filed, vacatur was still granted in
an overwhelming majority of cases, as shown in the table below.

195. Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J.) (“We
have disposed of the patent as a whole because it has seemed to us proper that it should not
remain in the art as a scarecrow.”).
196. See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 194, at 125–26.
197. Using Fisher’s exact test, the two-tailed p-value is 0.415.
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Table 10: Existence of Concurrent Litigation Handled by Other Judges
and Disposition of Vacatur Motion (# of Cases)
Patents NOT Involved in
Concurrent Litigation
Before Other Judges
N=61 (% of 61)

Patents Involved in
Concurrent Litigation
Before Other Judges
N=18 (% of 18)

Vacatur Granted

49 (80.3%)

13 (72.2%)

Vacatur Denied

10 (16.4%)

5 (27.8%)

2 (3.3%)

0

Disposition

Motion Withdrawn

There is no statistically significant difference in the rate of granting vacatur
(80.3% versus 72.2%) as a function of whether the same patent is being
concurrently litigated before a different judge.198 The marginal difference in grant
rates further supports the inference that district courts are effectively prioritizing
near-term docket relief above overall judicial economy and comity. As discussed
previously, vacating an otherwise non-defective ruling for no reason other than to
facilitate settlement can be highly disruptive to other courts, especially when they
must, in turn, vacate their own decisions that had relied on according collateral
estoppel effect to that earlier—now vacated—ruling.199 The goals of judicial
economy and comity may be better served if otherwise non-defective rulings are
never vacated if concurrent litigation exists in other courts.
Turning now to relitigation, the data reveal that a disproportionate number of
additional suits filed after the ruling on the vacatur motion involve patents with a
history of litigation.200
As of January 9, 2012, the patents implicated by the vacatur motions filed in 17
out of 79 cases in the dataset (21.5%) were involved in a total of 60 additional suits
filed after the court issued a ruling on the vacatur motion. The data on subsequent
suits will necessarily be underreported and incomplete because a patentee may
decide to wait years before filing another suit, which may occur at any time up to
six years after a patent’s expiration date.201
As summarized in the tables below, of the 60 additional cases that were filed
after the courts ruled on the vacatur motions, 54 cases (90%) involved patents that
had a history of litigation at the time the vacatur motion was filed. The following
tables summarize the numerical relationships in the dataset relating to the
grant/denial of vacatur, whether the case involves a patent with a history of
litigation, and the aggregate number of subsequent cases filed after the ruling on
the vacatur motion. Because additional suits were filed even when vacatur was
denied, separate tables were prepared for the granted and denied cases.202

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Using Fisher’s exact test, the two-tailed p-value is 0.519.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5); supra note 140 and accompanying text.
See infra Tables 11a and 11b.
See 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2006).
As of January 9, 2012, none of the patents associated with the 2 cases where the
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Table 11a: Relationship Between Litigation History and Subsequent
Litigation After Vacatur GRANTED

Cases Involving
Patents with—

Vacatur
Granted
N=62

Cases Whose
Patents Were Not
Subsequently
Litigated
N=47

Cases Whose
Patents Were
Subsequently
Litigated
N=15

New Cases
Filed After
Vacatur
Granted
N=56

Prior/Concurrent
Litigation at
Time of Motion

32

19 out of 32
(59.4%)

13 out of 32
(40.6%)

50

No Litigation
History at Time
of Motion

30

28 out of 30
(93.3%)

2 out of 30
(6.7%)

6

Table 11b: Relationship Between Litigation History and Subsequent
Litigation After Vacatur DENIED

Cases Involving
Patents with—

Vacatur
Denied
N=15

Cases Whose
Patents Were Not
Subsequently
Litigated
N=13

Cases Whose
Patents Were
Subsequently
Litigated
N=2

New Cases
Filed After
Vacatur
Denied
N=4

Prior/Concurrent
Litigation at
Time of Motion

10

8 out of 10
(80%)

2 out of 10
(20%)

4

No Litigation
History at Time
of Motion

5

5 out of 5
(100%)

0 out of 5
(0%)

0

Comparing Tables 11a and 11b at a high level, when vacatur was granted in 62
cases, the patents associated with 15 of those cases (24.2%; 15 out of 62) were
asserted in 56 new suits (3.7 subsequent suits per case), whereas when vacatur was
denied in 15 cases, the patents associated with 2 of those cases (13.3%; 2 out of 15)
were asserted in only 4 new suits (2 subsequent suits per case). These statistics
suggest that (1) the patents associated with only a fraction of the cases in which
vacatur is requested may be involved in subsequent suits, (2) when those patents
are relitigated, multiple assertions are likely; and (3) the denial of vacatur does not
necessarily prevent subsequent suits, but it may dampen their frequency.
vacatur motion was withdrawn were involved in subsequent litigation.
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Looking more closely at Table 11a, the number of cases where vacatur was
granted is substantially similar between the cases involving patents with a history
of litigation compared to those cases with patents that were being asserted for the
first time (32 versus 30, out of 62 cases). However, the difference in relitigation
rates of the patents associated with these two groups of cases is striking (40.6%
versus 6.7%). This difference is highly statistically significant.203 In addition,
looking at Table 11b, only the patents having a history of litigation were relitigated
when vacatur was denied.
Because more than half of the cases in the dataset involve patents with a history
of litigation—and the patents associated with only a fraction of those cases are
relitigated—we will also need to look at the characteristics of the patentee and the
technology in order to further refine the criteria for spotting cases with patents that
have a high likelihood of relitigation. This will be discussed in the remainder of
Part IV.E.
2. Patentee Type
If a certain type of patentee has a reputation for litigiousness, would this prompt
courts to deny vacatur for that type of patentee more often than others? According
to the dataset, the answer is, surprisingly, “no.” To analyze the possible effect of
patentee type on the grant of vacatur and relitigation, the patentees in the vacatur
dataset were classified into three groups—practicing company, patent assertion
entity (PAE), and individual—as follows:204
(1) Practicing Company: A patentee was classified as a “practicing company”
if it was primarily engaged in the production or sale of goods and services.
In addition, companies whose primary focus is not production but the
active development of new technologies through substantial research and
development (R&D) activity were also classified as “practicing
companies.”
(2) Patent Assertion Entity (PAE): A patentee was classified as a “patent
assertion entity” if it had no presence on the Internet except in connection
with patent litigation-related webpages or is a company (which may be a
subsidiary of a practicing company) whose primary focus is the litigation
or licensing (that is, monetization) of patents.
(3) Individuals: If an individual sued in his or her own name, then the patentee
was classified as an “individual.”

203. Using Fisher’s exact test, the two-tailed p-value is 0.002.
204. The three classifications are largely modeled after those defined in Colleen V.
Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 314 n.209 (2011), with certain
modifications for purposes of the vacatur dataset. The patentee classification was based on
the first-named plaintiff (or defendant in a declaratory judgment action) listed in the caption
of the vacatur motion or the associated order (if the motion itself was unavailable). Foreign
entities were classified using the same criteria as domestic entities. None of the first-named
patentees in the dataset were universities.

960

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:919

The table below summarizes the number of patentee types and the associated
vacatur grant rate and relitigation statistics:
Table 12: Vacatur Grant and Relitigation by Patentee Type
Cases in
Dataset
N=79
(% of 79)

Vacatur
Granted
N=62

Cases Whose
Patents Were
Subsequently
Litigated
N=17

New Cases
Filed After
Vacatur Ruling
N=60
(% of 60)

59
(74.7%)

45 out of 59
(76.3%)

9 out of 59
(15.3%)

41
(68.3%)

Patent Assertion
Entity (PAE)

15
(19%)

14 out of 15
(93.3%)

8 out of 15
(53.3%)

19
(31.7%)

Individual

5
(6.3%)

3 out of 5
(60%)

0 out of 5
(0%)

0

Patentee Type

Practicing
Company

A substantial majority of the patentees who requested vacatur were practicing
companies (74.7%), followed by PAEs (19%) and individuals (6.3%). Notably, the
vacatur grant rate is the highest for PAEs (93.3%; 14 out of 15 cases), followed by
practicing companies (76.3%; 45 out of 59 cases), and individuals (60%; 3 out of 5
cases).205 That the patents206 in more than half of the PAE cases in the dataset
(53.3%; 8 out of 15 cases) were involved in subsequent litigation is unsurprising
given the PAE business model of asserting the same patents against numerous
parties.207 The difference in the relitigation rate of patents from PAE cases
compared to that of practicing companies (53.3% versus 15.3%) is highly
statistically significant.208 Indeed, although PAE cases constituted only 19% of the
dataset (15 out of 79 cases), the patents from those cases were involved in 31.7% of
the new suits (19 out of 60 cases) filed after the ruling on the vacatur motion, as
shown below.

205. The difference in grant rates for PAE cases versus non-PAE cases, while substantial,
is not statistically significant: using Fisher’s exact test, the two-tailed p-value is 0.17.
206. That is, patents that would have benefitted from the grant of vacatur.
207. See, e.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or
Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 32
(2009) [hereinafter Allison et al., Extreme Value] (observing that PAEs “account for only
about 16% of the once-litigated patents, [but] represent over 80% of the suits filed involving
the most-litigated patents and own more than 50% of the most-litigated patents themselves”).
208. Using Fisher’s exact test, the two-tailed p-value is 0.004.
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Figure 2: Patentee Type in Dataset and New Cases Filed After Ruling on
Vacatur Motion (Relative Percentages)

That courts granted vacatur in PAE cases at a rate higher than in any other type
of case in the dataset appears counterintuitive because the availability of collateral
estoppel will have the greatest utility against PAE patents—which have a high
likelihood of relitigation—and vacatur was an express condition of settlement in, at
most, 4 out of the 15 PAE cases in the dataset.209 One possible explanation for the
willingness of courts to grant vacatur in PAE cases may be grounded in the
perception that PAEs, after an adverse ruling on an issue of patent liability, may be
more willing to continue litigation through appeal than other types of patentees. For
example, a PAE does not produce any products, such that, unlike a practicing
company, it will not be subject to counterclaims for infringement that can be used
as leverage for settlement. In addition, PAEs, whose primary sources of revenue are
royalties and settlement payments, are often represented on a contingency basis,
such that they have a strong incentive to appeal any adverse ruling that might
foreclose the recovery of damages or settlement payments in other suits.
Granting settlement-related vacatur when the patentee is known to be litigious
might provide a court with near-term docket relief; however, as discussed further in
Part IV.E.4, long-term judicial economy and the public interest may be better
served if vacatur were denied in such cases.
3. Technology Area
To evaluate whether any relationships might exist between the type of
technology, the grant of settlement-related vacatur, and relitigation, each case in the

209. In the 15 PAE cases, the vacatur motions in 2 cases contained an express statement
of conditionality, and in the 2 other cases, a formal motion was not filed such that
conditionality could not be determined.
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dataset was assigned to one of six technical categories210 based on the subject
matter of the patents that would benefit from the grant of vacatur. The six
categories were defined as follows:
(1) Pharmaceutical: Chemicals for treating medical conditions, and methods
for developing, manufacturing, using, or administering the same.
(2) Semiconductor: Semiconductor circuits/devices, and equipment and
methods for designing, testing, and fabricating the same.
(3) Computer, Electronics, and Software (CES): Hybrid category covering
inventions where underlying technology that is primary focus of claim
scope is directed to computers, electronics, software, or combination
thereof.
(4) Medical: Inventions related to treating or diagnosing medical conditions,
as well as inventions for conducting medical research. This category
excludes pharmaceuticals.
(5) Mechanical: Inventions relating primarily to manufacturing, configuring,
or using mechanical devices or parts, or key aspect of the invention
involves use of mechanical devices or parts.
(6) Other: Inventions that do not fall into categories listed above.
The table below tallies the number of cases in each technology area and
summarizes their dispositions and relitigation statistics.

210. The categories were defined specifically for this Article in light of the inadequacies
of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s classification system, as noted by other scholars.
See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2114 (2000) (“[W]e did not find
[the PTO classification system] particularly reliable. . . . [W]e came upon numerous
instances of what appear to us to be wrong or arbitrary classification decisions. . . . [T]he
PTO system groups together technologies that may have very different characteristics.”).
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Table 13: Vacatur Grant and Relitigation by Technology Area

Vacatur
Granted
N=62

Cases Whose
Patents Were
Subsequently
Litigated
N=17

New Cases
Filed After
Vacatur
Ruling
N=60
(% of 60)

5
(6.3%)

3 out of 5
(60%)

4 out of 5
(80%)

19
(31.7%)

Semiconductor

5
(6.3%)

3 out of 5
(60%)

2 out of 5
(40%)

8
(13.3%)

Computer, Elecs.,
and Software (CES)

32
(40.5%)

27 out of 32
(84.4%)

8 out of 32
(25%)

20
(33.3%)

Medical

7
(8.9%)

5 out of 7
(71.4%)

2 out of 7
(28.6%)

5
(8.3%)

Mechanical

20
(25.3%)

15 out of 20
(75%)

1 out of 20
(5%)

8
(13.3%)

Other

10
(12.7%)

9 out of 10
(90%)

0 out of 10
(0%)

0

Cases in
Dataset
N=79
(% of 79)

Pharmaceutical

Technology Area

At one end of the spectrum, the CES cases form the largest group in the dataset
at 40.5% (32 out of 79 cases), whereas at the other end, the pharmaceutical and
semiconductor cases each constitute only 6.3% (5 out of 79 cases). The patents
relating to mechanical and “other” cases appear the least likely to be relitigated.
The one case out of 20 mechanical cases whose patent was subsequently litigated in
8 new cases appears to be an outlier, as mechanical patents tend to be litigated only
once.211 The figure below provides a graphical comparison of the relative
percentages of the technology areas represented in the cases in the dataset with
those of the new cases that were filed after the ruling on the vacatur motion:

211. See Allison et al., Extreme Value, supra note 207, at 18 (“Mechanical inventions
make up only 8% of the most-litigated patents, but 53% of the once-litigated patents . . . .”).
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Figure 3: Technology Areas of Dataset Cases and New Cases Filed After
Ruling on Vacatur Motion (Relative Percentages)

Although pharmaceutical cases were only 6.3% of the cases in the vacatur
dataset, they constituted 31.7% (19 out of 60) of the new cases filed after the court
ruled on the vacatur motion. Also notable is the number of new semiconductor
cases filed out of proportion to their number in the dataset (6.3% in the dataset;
13.3% of new cases) because semiconductor patents are not usually involved in
repeat litigation.212
The pharmaceutical cases and the CES cases together constitute the majority of
the subsequent suits (65%; 39 out of 60 cases), which is consistent with prior
research reporting that these two types of cases are disproportionately prone to
repeat litigation.213 This is unsurprising given the considerable size of the product
markets associated with those technologies and the numerous potential accused
infringers. This suggests that the preservation of potential collateral estoppel effect
for the rulings in the pharmaceutical cases and the CES cases may have a greater
beneficial impact on overall judicial economy and the public interest than in other
types of cases where the likelihood of relitigation is low.

212. See Allison et al., Extreme Value, supra note 207, at 20 (“Notably absent from this
list [of most-litigated patents] is the semiconductor industry . . . .”); see also John R. Allison,
Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J.
435, 474 (2004) (“While semiconductor patents constitute a substantial fraction of all patents
issued, they are far less likely to be litigated than any other type of patent. Only 8.2% of the
semiconductor patents in our sample study were litigated, compared with 24.3% of the
nonsemiconductor patents.” (footnotes omitted)).
213. Allison et al., Extreme Value, supra note 207, at 18–20.
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4. Synthesis of Patent Characteristics and Likelihood of Relitigation
In the preceding sections, the patentee types and technology areas represented in
the vacatur dataset were evaluated separately. A matrix of the patentees and
technologies may provide additional analytical granularity, as provided below for
the 79 cases in the vacatur dataset (Table 14a), as well as the 60 subsequent cases
that were filed after the ruling on the vacatur motion (Table 14b):
Table 14a: Patentee Types and Technology Areas
in Dataset (# of Cases; % of 79)
Practicing
Company
N=59

Patent Assertion
Entity (PAE)
N=15

Individual
N=5

Pharmaceutical (N=5)

5 (6.3%)

0

0

Semiconductor (N=5)

4 (5.1%)

1 (1.3%)

0

16 (20.3%)

13 (16.5%)

3 (3.8%)

7 (8.9%)

0

0

Mechanical (N=20)

18 (22.8%)

0

2 (2.5%)

Other (N=10)

9 (11.4%)

1 (1.3%)

0

Technology Area

Computer, Elecs., and
Software (CES) (N=32)
Medical (N=7)

Table 14b: Patentee Types and Technology Areas
in Subsequent Cases (# of Cases; % of 60)
Technology Area

Practicing
Company
N=41

Patent Assertion
Entity (PAE)
N=19

Individual
N=0

Pharmaceutical (N=19)

19 (31.7%)

0

0

Semiconductor (N=8)

7 (11.7%)

1 (1.7%)

0

Computer, Elecs., and
Software (CES) (N=20)

2 (3.3%)

18 (30%)

0

Medical (N=5)

5 (8.3%)

0

0

Mechanical (N=8)

8 (13.3%)

0

0

0

0

0

Other (N=0)
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Comparing Tables 14a and 14b, it is notable that pharmaceutical cases brought
by practicing companies and CES cases brought by PAEs together account for only
22.8% of the vacatur dataset but 61.7% of the subsequent suits. In addition, the
number of CES cases in which vacatur motions were filed is similar for practicing
companies and PAEs (16 versus 13, Table 14a), but the subsequent CES cases
overwhelmingly involve PAEs (2 versus 18, Table 14b). This difference is highly
statistically significant.214 A comparison of the top five case types in Tables 14a
and 14b is provided below, with the differences bolded:
Table 15: Top 5 Technology-Patentee Combinations
Vacatur Dataset (% of 79)

Subsequent Cases (% of 60)

1. Mechanical / Practicing Co. (22.8%)

1. Pharmaceutical / Practicing Co. (31.7%)

2. CES / Practicing Co. (20.3%)

2. CES / PAE (30%)

3. CES / PAE (16.5%)

3. Mechanical / Practicing Co (13.3%)

4. Other / Practicing Co. (11.4%)

4. Semiconductor / Practicing Co. (11.7%)

5. Medical / Practicing Co. (8.9%)

5. Medical / Practicing Co. (8.3%)

The data suggest that a patentee for whom litigation against potential infringers
is critical to its business, such as PAEs and pharmaceutical companies, will likely
reassert its patents after the ruling on the vacatur motion, even if it is denied.215
Where the factors point to a high likelihood of relitigation, denying vacatur to
preserve collateral estoppel effect may ultimately yield greater benefits to judicial
economy and the public interest than granting vacatur, not only because of the
benefits of collateral estoppel and finality, but also because the most-litigated
patents also tend to be the weakest, prevailing only 10.7% of the time if litigated to
judgment.216 For example, patents asserted by PAEs, also known in the literature as
“non-practicing entities” (NPEs), win only 9.2% of the time.217 Similarly, in

214. Using Fisher’s exact test, the two-tailed p-value is 0.002.
215. The 2 cases in the dataset whose patents were asserted in 4 new cases despite the
denial of vacatur, see supra Table 11b, involved a PAE and a pharmaceutical company.
216. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement
Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 680 (2011) [hereinafter Allison et al.,
Repeat Litigants] (“[T]he most-litigated patents that go to judgment are far more likely to be
held invalid or not infringed. . . . Once-litigated patents win in court almost 50% of the time,
while the most-litigated—and putatively most valuable—patents win in court only 10.7% of
the time.”).
217. Id. at 680–81 (“NPEs [non-practicing entities] and software patentees
overwhelmingly lose their cases, even with patents that they litigate again and again.
Software patentees win only 12.9% of their cases, while NPEs win only 9.2%.”).
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pharmaceutical patent litigation, a study by the Federal Trade Commission found
that patentees lost to generic companies 73% of the time between 1992 and 2000.218
For some courts, the potential judicial economy arising from collateral estoppel
may be more immediate and direct: 30% of the new cases (18 out of 60) were filed
in the same district court where the prior (dataset) case was filed, and a clear
majority of those new cases (77.8%; 14 out of 18) that were filed in the same
district was eventually assigned to the same judge who granted vacatur in the prior
(dataset) case. One possible reason why a patentee may file subsequent suits in the
same district is that the patentee believes that there is a high likelihood of being
assigned to the same judge who is both familiar with the technology and has shown
a willingness to grant settlement-related motions for vacatur. Indeed, as discussed
previously,219 if a judge develops a reputation for reliably granting vacatur—which
is becoming easier to establish unwittingly, given the advances in legal informatics
that allow the systematic review of every docket item in every patent case for a
specific judge—then patentees whose cases are assigned to that judge may attempt
to adopt a “roll the dice” litigation strategy, where the prospect of guaranteed
vacatur may lead them to take a wait-and-see approach that prolongs litigation in a
weak case. For this reason, denying settlement-related vacatur, especially where the
patentee is a repeat litigant, would be beneficial not only for long-term judicial
economy and the public interest, but also for efficient near-term case management.
F. Availability of Intervention
As previously discussed,220 intervention is expected to be rare in the vacatur
dataset. The results confirm this: motions to intervene were filed in only 4 out of
the 79 cases in the dataset (5.1%) for the purpose of opposing vacatur.221 In 3 of
those 4 cases, the potential intervenor was adverse to the patentee in a parallel
action involving at least one of the patents that would benefit from the grant of
vacatur. Intervention was allowed in only one of the 4 cases, and in that one case,
the court ultimately granted vacatur.222 The rarity of intervention motions is striking

218. Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Before the Special Committee
on Aging of the United States Senate on Barriers to Generic Entry: Hearing Before the S.
Spec.
Comm.
on
Aging,
109th
Cong.
10
(2006),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/07/P052103BarrierstoGenericEntryTestimonySenate07202006.p
df (“The [Federal Trade] Commission studied all patent litigation initiated between 1992 and
2000 between brand-name drug manufacturers and Paragraph IV generic challengers, and
found that the generics prevailed in cases involving 73 percent of the challenged drug
products.” (footnote omitted)).
219. See supra text accompanying note 177.
220. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text.
221. In the dataset, there were also 3 cases in which objections to the vacatur motion
were lodged without an attempt to intervene: in 2 cases, the court provided an opportunity
for the non-settling parties in related or consolidated cases to object, and, in the remaining
case, a third party filed an objection without attempting to intervene.
222. The intervenor appealed the grant of vacatur, but voluntarily dismissed its appeal
after settling with the patentee. Order, CollegeNET, Inc. v. XAP Corp., No. 3:03-cv-01229BR (D. Or. Oct. 1, 2009), ECF No. 934 (dismissal of appeal); Appellants
ApplicationsOnline, LLC’s and The Common Application, Inc.’s Statement of Issues for
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given that 43 out of the 79 cases (54.4%) in the dataset involve patents with a
history of litigation (prior or concurrent or both) that would benefit from the
vacatur of certain adverse decisions.223 A patent with a history of litigation is likely
to have third parties who would be concerned about its scope, validity, and
enforcement issues in light of the patentee’s litigiousness—yet, motions to
intervene were filed in only 4 cases in the dataset.
Possible factors that may contribute to the scarcity of intervention motions may
include timing and notice issues that make it difficult for third parties to timely file
them. The table below summarizes the average and median number of days it takes
a court to rule on a vacatur motion in the dataset, as measured between the date of
the motion224 and the date of the ruling:225
Table 16: Time Between Filing of Motion
and Ruling on Vacatur (in days)
Cases226 with Ruling
on Vacatur Motion
N=77

Vacatur
Granted
N=62

Vacatur
Denied
N=15

0 / 333

0 / 245

1 / 333

Average

25

19

48

Median

4

4

11

Std. Dev.

57

43

93

Range
(Low/High)

In the dataset, courts decided vacatur motions, on average, 25 days after they
were filed. However, as shown in Table 16, this average appears to be heavily
skewed by outliers. A more telling statistic is the median number of days. In
approximately half of the cases where vacatur was granted (35 out of 62), the court
issued its decision within 4 days. Notably, 22.6% of the decisions granting vacatur
(14 out of 62) were issued at a pace that gave third parties less than a day to object
prior to the court’s decision: in 8 cases, the motion was granted the same day it was
filed, and in 6 cases, the court granted vacatur without a formal written motion

Appeal at 2–3, CollegeNET, Inc. v. XAP Corp., No. 3:03-cv-01229-BR (D. Or. July 10,
2009), ECF No. 932 (issues appealed). As a result, an opportunity was lost for the Federal
Circuit to directly consider the merits of a district court’s decision to grant settlement-related
vacatur.
223. See supra Part IV.E.1.
224. The date of the vacatur motion was calculated as described at supra note 137.
225. The date of the ruling used to calculate the elapsed time is the date the judge signed
the ruling, not when the ruling was posted to PACER. Also, if the district court provided an
indicative (or tentative) ruling and subsequently issued a formal order, the date coded was
that of the formal order.
226. This does not include the 2 cases where the motion was withdrawn.
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having been filed beforehand, such that the first indication in the docket of the
parties’ intent to seek vacatur was the order granting it.227
The alacrity with which vacatur motions are typically granted may ultimately
impair the ability of third parties to timely move to intervene prior to the court’s
ruling. Furthermore, because cases are often closed or dismissed the same day or
shortly after vacatur is granted, it may be difficult for third parties to file a motion
to intervene before the case has terminated, let alone before the grant of vacatur.228
Even if potential intervenors were to monitor the docket constantly, they may
nevertheless be prevented from filing timely motions to intervene because of a
failure of notice arising from vacatur motions that are not fully accessible to the
public. In 9 out of 79 cases (11.4%) in the dataset, the contents of the vacatur
motion—or even its existence—were obscured from the public when the parties
initially requested vacatur. In 3 of those cases, the earliest document that provided
notice of the parties’ intent to move for vacatur was filed under seal.229 In the
remaining 6 cases, a written motion does not appear to have been filed, as indicated
by the absence of any corresponding PACER docket entry, which suggests that
those motions were raised during a hearing or a conference with the court, which
are often held off-the-record if settlement is discussed.230 In such cases, a potential
intervenor would not be aware of the existence of a request for vacatur until the
court entered a ruling on the motion, at which point, it may be too late to intervene.
The courts granted vacatur in 8 out of these 9 cases with notice issues.
Even in the absence of timing and notice issues, a timely motion for intervention
is not likely to be granted. As previously noted, the preservation of collateral
estoppel effect is not presently a basis for granting intervention as of right, and
courts may be reluctant to grant permissive intervention when settlement is near.231
Indeed, 3 of the 4 intervention motions filed in the dataset were timely, yet
intervention was granted in only a single case. The table below summarizes the
conditions under which the intervention motions were filed and decided in those 4
cases, labeled A through D:

227. If no motion was filed, the time between the motion and the vacatur ruling was
coded as zero days.
228. Intervention motions filed post-judgment or after dismissal—other than to request
access to documents sealed under a protective order—are strongly disfavored. 6 MOORE,
supra note 35, at §§ 24.11, 24.21.
229. In coding whether a motion was filed under seal, the status of only the cover motion
and any supporting memorandum of law was considered. The status of the declarations,
exhibits, or other attachments was not considered, because those items are routinely filed
under seal.
230. See, e.g., Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 2, at 25 (“[T]he meetings or
conferences at which judges may encourage settlement tend to occur out of public view and
off the record, thereby sheltering the judge’s actions from scrutiny and eliminating the
protections afforded in formal proceedings.” (footnote omitted)); Resnik, Managerial
Judges, supra note 6, at 402 n.115 (“Because most pretrial conferences are off the record,
little documentation is available.”).
231. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
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Table 17: Disposition of Intervention Motions Filed in Dataset (4 Total)

Case

A232

Time Between
Vacatur
Motion and
Intervention
Motion
(in days)

Intervention
Motion Filed
Before or
After Court
Ruled on
Vacatur
Motion?

Are Patentee
and Potential
Intervenor
Directly Adverse
re: Patents
Affected by
Vacatur?

Intervention
Granted or
Denied?

Vacatur
Ruling

11

After

Yes (Adversarial
Negotiation and
Arbitration)

Denied

Granted

B233

7

Before

Yes (Concurrent
Litigation)

C234

1

Before

Yes (Concurrent
Litigation)

D235

7

Before

Yes (Concurrent
Litigation)

Denied, but
amicus
briefs
allowed
Dismissed
as moot
after
vacatur
denial
Granted

Denied

Denied

Granted

In short, the predominant manner in which district courts currently handle
vacatur motions appears to introduce timing and notice issues that inhibit the timely
filing of motions to intervene, which, when coupled with the courts’ reluctance to
grant permissive intervention when the parties are negotiating settlement, can
create an environment where “[t]here will be no opposing voice when the parties
move for vacatur,”236 as noted by Judge Moore. To ameliorate this situation, district

232. Agere Sys. Inc. v. Atmel Corp., No. 2:02-cv-00864-LDD (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2006),
ECF No. 435 (motion to intervene by Rohm Company, Ltd., filed under seal). That the
patentee, Agere, and the potential intervenor, Rohm, were likely engaged in adversarial
negotiations around the time of the intervention attempt, and were subsequently involved in
arbitration, was revealed in a complaint that Agere later filed at the International Trade
Commission to assert one of the patents that benefitted from the grant of vacatur. See
Complaint at 35 ¶ 106, Certain Semiconductor Integrated Circuits Using Tungsten
Metallization & Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-648 (Apr. 18, 2008).
233. Infineon Techs. N. Am. Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Inc., No. 5:02-cv-05772-JF (N.D.
Cal. July 31, 2006), ECF No. 116 (motion to intervene by Micron Technology, Inc.).
234. Avid Identification Sys. v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No. 2:04-cv-00183-TJW
(E.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2008), ECF No. 462 (motion to intervene by Allflex USA, Inc.).
235. CollegeNET, Inc. v. XAP Corp., No. 3:03-cv-01229-BR (D. Or. May 1, 2009), ECF
No. 917 (motion to intervene by ApplicationsOnline, LLC and The Common Application,
Inc.).
236. Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., 629 F.3d 1374, 1376 n.1 (Moore, J.,
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courts could consider the following options, which have already been used in some
cases in the dataset:
(1) To provide an adequate opportunity for third parties to weigh in on the
potential impact of vacatur, the court could establish a briefing window
during which third parties may move to intervene or, alternatively, file
amicus briefs.237
(2) To avoid notice issues, the court could require the entire motion for
vacatur and its supporting documents—including the settlement
agreement—to be publicly filed without redactions.238 If the parties are
using as a bargaining chip the potential preclusive effect of an otherwise
non-defective ruling that was created through the expenditure of public
funds, then the public should be allowed to review the terms of the
settlement agreement that was negotiated with that bargaining chip.
Prohibiting the filing of vacatur motions under seal may also have the
salutary effect of discouraging parties from seeking such relief.239
To the extent that providing an adequate opportunity for notice and objection by
third parties could discourage some settlements, it would affect primarily those
cases where the parties are attempting to use settlement-related vacatur as a
substitute for appeal, for which the equitable remedy of vacatur is inappropriate.240

concurring).
237. Examples from the dataset: Scheduling Order, CollegeNET, Inc. v. XAP Corp., No.
3:03-cv-01229-BR (D. Or. Apr. 10, 2009), ECF No. 913; and Civil Minutes, Infineon Techs.
N. Am. Corp. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., No. 5:02-cv-05772 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2006), ECF No.
111.
238. Example from the dataset: Order, PBI Performance Prods., Inc. v. Norfab Corp., No.
2:05-cv-04836-HB (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2008), ECF No. 117 (order unsealing joint motion for
vacatur). The joint motion for vacatur in this case included the settlement agreement as an
attachment. Joint Motion for Vacatur of the August 29, 2007 Order Invalidating U.S. Patent
No. 6,624,096 for Obviousness at 10, PBI Performance Prods., Inc. v. Norfab Corp., No.
2:05-cv-04836-HB (E.D. Pa. June 9, 2008), ECF No. 113-1.
239. In one case in the dataset, the parties withdrew their vacatur motion after the court
ordered them to justify their motion as well as their request to seal. See Assented-To Motion
to Withdraw Pending Motions, Skyline Software Sys., Inc. v. Keyhole Corp., No. 06-cv10980 (D. Mass. Feb. 11, 2008), ECF No. 95 (withdrawal of vacatur motion); Procedural
Order, Skyline Software Sys., Inc. v. Keyhole Corp., No. 06-cv-10980 (D. Mass. Feb. 5,
2008), ECF No. 93 (order requesting justification to seal).
240. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 25 (1994); see
also 12 MOORE, supra note 35, at § 60.48[1] (“In fact, the courts always require that there be
‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying relief [under Rule 60(b)(6)]. To read the provisions
otherwise would permit the discretion vested in a court by Rule 60(b) to be used to make
unnecessary inroads into judgments that would otherwise be final, or to transform Rule 60(b)
into a substitute for appeals.” (citations omitted)).
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V. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Persuasive Precedent is Not Enough
The data suggest that granting settlement-related vacatur is a false economy. As
discussed throughout Part IV, district courts appear to be prioritizing near-term
case management by granting motions for settlement-related vacatur even when it
could undermine overall judicial economy and adversely affect the interests of the
public at large. For cases involving repeat litigants, the benefits that may accrue
from denying vacatur and preserving the preclusive effect of a ruling outweigh the
incremental additional work involved in continued litigation through appeal,
especially since the most-litigated patents are often weak and have a higher-thanaverage loss rate if litigated to judgment.241
Some may question, however, whether settlement-related vacatur is truly a
cause for concern in view of the fact that a vacated ruling typically remains
accessible to the public, other litigants, and other courts via PACER and electronic
databases (for example, Lexis and Westlaw), such that a vacated ruling that is
stripped of any preclusive effect may still be used as persuasive precedent. There
are several reasons why the availability of persuasive precedent does not obviate
the need to curtail the practice of settlement-related vacatur.
First, the fact that a ruling has been vacated may embolden patentees to
continue to assert patents that may be weak and, at the same time, potentially
discourage accused infringers from challenging dubious claims of infringement in
view of the prospect of having to litigate without the potential benefit of collateral
estoppel against a patentee who also has an informational advantage by virtue of
having tested his major theories in a prior case. As previously noted, 93.3% of the
new cases (56 out of 60) filed after the ruling on the vacatur motion involved
patents associated with cases where vacatur was granted.242 Because the denial of
vacatur may discourage the reassertion of weak patents and marginal claims of
infringement, vacatur should generally be denied, including those cases where the
patentee makes it an express condition of settlement.243
Second, if a later court declines to accord collateral estoppel effect to a prior
ruling, and treats it instead as persuasive precedent, that prior ruling may be given
greater persuasive weight if it remained “intact” than if it were vacated. This is
because the reason for vacatur is not always apparent.244 As the data show, vacatur
is granted usually without any reasoned explanation,245 such that other courts may
not be able to discern the degree to which the prior court was confident in its
ruling.246 In some cases, it is possible that the court granted vacatur, in part,

241. See supra notes 216–218.
242. See supra Tables 11a and 11b.
243. See supra Part IV.D.
244. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 2, at 630 (“Although a vacated decision may remain in
the case reporters, its precedential value is extremely limited. . . . A litigant citing a vacated
decision cannot be sure that the court did not vacate based on second thoughts about the
legitimacy of the legal rulings.” (footnote omitted)).
245. See supra Part IV.B.
246. Professor Jill Fisch suggests that “[c]ourts could resolve this problem by stating
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because it had doubts about its ruling in light of the popular perception that the
claim construction reversal rate is “too high.”247 Alternatively, the court might have
been extremely confident in its ruling but granted vacatur for the sole purpose of
facilitating settlement. Accordingly, in the absence of any substantive explanation
of the reasons for granting vacatur, later courts might accord a vacated ruling less
persuasive weight than it might otherwise deserve.
Third, the vacated ruling may not always remain accessible for use as persuasive
precedent. In particular, the parties might request—as a further condition of
settlement—that the court also order the removal of the vacated rulings from Lexis
and Westlaw,248 and also from the court’s electronic docket so that those rulings are
no longer available on PACER.249 That some courts have in recent years250 ordered
the removal of electronic versions of vacated rulings raises concerns as to how far
courts would be willing to go to fulfill the conditions of the parties’ settlement
agreements. In addition, if courts were to routinely accord substantial persuasive
weight to vacated rulings, the next logical step in the evolution of the joint motion
for vacatur could be the inclusion of a provision whereby the settlement is
contingent on the court issuing an opinion actively disavowing and criticizing the
vacated ruling, so as to substantially weaken any persuasive value that it may have.
Motions for settlement-related vacatur are, accordingly, a cause for concern in view
of their potential for manipulation of judicial proceedings and the public record.
More generally, settlement-related motions for vacatur have the “look and feel”
of collusion and cartel-like behavior:251 the once-opposing parties jointly seek
vacatur of an adverse ruling so as to resurrect a patent that may be asserted against

explicitly the grounds for vacatur whenever they grant a motion to vacate . . . .” Fisch, supra
note 2, at 630 n.211.
247. E.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of
Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1037 (2007) (“[C]omputing claim
construction reversal rates has been a popular sport: numerous studies have reported claim
construction reversal rates from about 25% to 50%. Based on these statistics, the notion that
the reversal rate is ‘too high’ has become firmly ingrained in the minds of commentators,
practitioners, and judges alike . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). In the dataset, the de novo review
of claim construction rulings was mentioned in at least 5 vacatur motions and in one of the
few orders where the court provided a reasoned analysis of its decision to grant vacatur.
248. See, e.g., Order, Klein v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 2:04-cv-00955 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 6, 2009), ECF No. 225 (granting vacatur and ordering removal of rulings from Lexis
and Westlaw). In Klein, a personal injury case filed against Amtrak, the confidential
settlement included a provision that called for the vacatur of certain published opinions and
their removal from Lexis and Westlaw. Shannon P. Duffy, After Settlement, Opinions Erased
in Amtrak Case, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 19, 2009, at 1 (“[A] spokeswoman for
Westlaw, said [the judge’s] request to remove the opinions would ‘absolutely’ be honored,
and that any instance in which a judge vacates a published opinion automatically leads to its
withdrawal from Westlaw’s database. Calls to Lexis were not returned by press time.”).
249. See, e.g., Docket Entry Text, SourceOne Global Partners, LLC v. KGK Synergize,
Inc., No. 1:08-cv-07403 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2012), ECF No. 165 (“The agreed joint motion to
vacate . . . is granted . . . . [M]emorandum opinion and order (doc. # 117) is hereby vacated;
the Clerk of the Court is instructed to remove that memorandum opinion and order, and the
accompanying minute order (doc. # 116), from the docket.”).
250. See supra notes 248–249.
251. The author thanks Mark Lemley for this point.
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others in the industry. Although the grant of vacatur is a judicial act, the mere
involvement of a court in connection with a settlement may not necessarily
eliminate potential antitrust issues (a prime example being “reverse payment”
agreements in pharmaceutical patent cases).252 Future research could investigate the
antitrust implications of settlement-related vacatur in greater depth.
B. Appellate Considerations
Curtailing settlement-related vacatur may be difficult to accomplish without
further guidance from the Federal Circuit that clarifies the standards for evaluating
motions to vacate at the district court level. In particular, Bancorp should be
formally extended to the district courts in a precedential Federal Circuit opinion. In
addition to a clear pronouncement that “exceptional circumstances” do not include
the mere fact that the parties have settled and are forgoing appeal, specific guidance
on what does and does not constitute “exceptional circumstances” is needed in
view of the data revealing that district courts are routinely vacating final judgments
despite the “extraordinary circumstances” requirement of Rule 60(b)(6).253 To
discourage gaming by the parties, the Bancorp standard should be further extended
to interlocutory orders, rather than being limited to final judgments, since any
impact on judicial economy arising from vacatur before or after the entry of
judgment is largely one of degree.254 The formal extension of Bancorp to the
district courts is long overdue and is a step that some district courts have already
taken by applying the principles from Bancorp to deny vacatur of final decisions255
as well as interlocutory rulings.256

252. Cf. Mark L. Kovner, Colin R. Kass & Avery W. Gardiner, Applying the Noerr
Doctrine to Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 609, 629 n.54
(2003) (“[T]he fact that a settlement is ‘so ordered’ does not necessarily save it from
antitrust liability.”).
253. See supra Parts IV.A.2, B.
254. See, e.g., Allen-Bradley Co. v. Kollmorgen Corp., 199 F.R.D. 316, 318 (E.D. Wis.
2001) (“In terms of judicial economy, the difference between vacatur after judgment and
vacatur before judgment, but after a Markman hearing and order, is only one of degree.”).
255. See, e.g., Medtronic Vascular, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., No. 2-06-cv-78, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10109, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2009) (“[T]he parties have failed to show an
equitable entitlement to an ‘extraordinary remedy’ of vacatur. The only reason
presented . . . is that the parties have entered into a settlement agreement. Granting a
vacatur . . . would effectively result in the exact same relief that Bancorp holds is
inappropriate.”); Order, PBI Performance Prods. Inc. v. Norfab Corp., No. 2:05-cv-04836
(E.D. Pa. June 25, 2008), ECF No. 115, at 1 (citing Bancorp in denying vacatur).
256. See, e.g., Allen-Bradley, 199 F.R.D. at 320 (“[The] claim construction order, like
nearly all court decisions and orders, affects interests beyond those of the parties in the
present action. The benefits of settling the present action are, in short, outweighed by the
systemic costs that would be incurred by vacating the court’s order.”); Zinus, Inc. v.
Simmons Bedding Co., No C 07-3012 PVT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33359, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 23, 2008) (“[T]he court entertained several rounds of briefing, . . . heard an hour of oral
argument, and spent several days drafting the [summary judgment] opinion. The public paid
for this use of court resources through its tax dollars. Vacatur would render that expenditure
a waste . . . .”).
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Any doctrinal changes adopted by the Federal Circuit that are intended to
restrict the practice of settlement-related vacatur may be more effective if the
Federal Circuit’s Mediation Guidelines were also updated to support that objective.
If the Circuit Mediators are suggesting the filing of vacatur motions during
mediation sessions, this could potentially send mixed messages to litigants and
district courts as to whether settlement-related vacatur is somehow being condoned
by the Federal Circuit. Although, as a matter of official court policy, the Federal
Circuit and its Appellate Mediation Program take no position on whether such
motions should be granted,257 the very fact that a Circuit Mediator had suggested
the vacatur motion could nevertheless make that motion appear more legitimate or
compelling than may be warranted by the circumstances. For example, over a year
after issuing the precedential order in Ohio Willow Wood, the Federal Circuit
remanded a case258 to allow the parties to jointly move the district court to vacate
an invalidity ruling. At the district court, third parties objected to the vacatur
motion,259 and the patentee—a PAE—emphasized in its briefing that the Chief
Circuit Mediator had suggested moving to vacate the invalidity ruling in order to
facilitate settlement.260 The district court granted vacatur.261
Finally, the fact that the Federal Circuit has not yet had an opportunity to
consider the merits of a district court’s decision to grant vacatur is symptomatic of
the high barrier to intervention by third-party objectors, as discussed previously.262
At the appellate level, this barrier is further heightened by the Federal Circuit
whenever it adopts a rigid, narrow reading of the applicable regional circuit law in
evaluating the timeliness of an intervention motion.263 Whether a motion to

257. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
258. Ameranth, Inc. v. Menusoft Sys. Corp., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 849 (Fed. Cir. Jan.
13, 2012).
259. Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amicus Curiae Profitstreams, LLC, Ameranth,
Inc. v. Menusoft Sys. Corp., No. 2:07-cv-271-DF (E.D. Tex. Nov. 4. 2011), ECF No. 333;
Motion by Non-Party Seamless N. Am., LLC for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief,
Ameranth, Inc. v. Menusoft Sys. Corp., No. 2:07-cv-271-DF (E.D. Tex. Nov. 11, 2011),
ECF No. 334.
260. On remand in Ameranth, the patentee stressed the Chief Circuit Mediator’s role in
suggesting the vacatur motion that targeted the invalidity decision:
The public interest in resources expended by this Court and by the
Federal Circuit would be respected by vacatur of the invalidity verdicts and
judgment . . . . The Federal Circuit’s objectives would also be respected
since the settlement would not have been reached without the efforts of the
Chief Federal Circuit Mediator and his suggestion of the motion for
vacatur to facilitate the settlement.
Plaintiff Ameranth’s Opposition to Non-Party Seamless N. Am., LLC’s Motion for Leave to
File Amicus Curiae Brief at 10–11, Ameranth, Inc. v. Menusoft Sys. Corp., No. 2:07-cv-271DF (E.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2011), ECF No. 336 (emphasis added).
261. Order, Ameranth, Inc. v. Menusoft Sys. Corp., No. 2:07-cv-271 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 6,
2012), ECF No. 355 (granting vacatur).
262. See supra Part IV.F.
263. See, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. InterDigital Commc’ns, 418 F.3d 1217, 1222, 1224 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (reversing district court’s grant of intervention because “[third-party objector’s]
motion to intervene failed to satisfy the Fifth Circuit requirement that there be an existing
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intervene is timely is not an inquiry that can be satisfied by bright-line rules.264
Accordingly, when evaluating the timeliness of an intervention motion filed to
oppose the grant of settlement-related vacatur, the Federal Circuit should also
consider the broader context of whether the public had adequate notice and an
opportunity to timely intervene.
CONCLUSION
The grant of settlement-related motions for vacatur is presently the rule rather
than the exception in patent cases at the district court level. Where the decision
targeted for vacatur relates to the scope, validity, or enforceability of a patent,
granting vacatur may be a false economy. This is especially the case when, as the
data reveal, most courts are granting vacatur summarily265 without regard to the
litigation history of the patent;266 the litigiousness of the patentee;267 whether the
targeted ruling is final or interlocutory;268 the existence of concurrent proceedings
involving the same patent;269 or whether third parties have adequate notice and an
opportunity to object.270 In addition, settlement-related vacatur does not appear to
substantially change the timing of settlements271 or case duration272 at the district
court level; rather, it appears to function primarily as a bargaining chip during
settlement negotiations.273
The district courts’ willingness to grant vacatur leaves the judiciary vulnerable
to strategic behavior274 and manipulation275 by litigants—especially repeat
players—and burdens the public with the anticompetitive effects of weak
patents.276 For this reason, settlement-related vacatur of any rulings affecting patent
liability issues should be denied in the absence of “exceptional circumstances.”277

suit in which to intervene” and, on that basis, deeming it unnecessary to reach merits of
district court’s vacatur ruling).
264. In general, courts evaluate the following four factors to determine timeliness:
(1) The length of time the intervenor knew or should have known of
its interest in the case before moving to intervene;
(2) The prejudice to the original parties, if intervention is granted,
resulting from the intervenor’s delay in making its motion to intervene;
(3) Prejudice to the intervenor if the motion is denied; and
(4) Any unusual circumstances mitigating for or against a
determination that the motion is timely.
6 MOORE, supra note 35, § 24.21.
265. See supra Part IV.B.
266. See supra Part IV.E.1.
267. See supra Part IV.E.2.
268. See supra Part IV.A.2.
269. See supra Part IV.E.1.
270. See supra Part IV.F.
271. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
272. See supra Table 7.
273. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
274. See supra text accompanying note 219.
275. See supra notes 248–250 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 215–218 and accompanying text.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 253–256.
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In short, a patentee who miscalculates his chances of prevailing and fails to settle
prior to the issuance of an adverse ruling should not be allowed to escape the
consequences of that ruling at the public’s expense.
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APPENDIX A: IPLC SEARCH PARAMETERS
To find the relevant cases, the following search parameters were used to gather
an initial list of docket entries that were individually reviewed to identify each case
in which a settlement-related vacatur motion was filed that satisfied the subject
matter and time period restrictions of the vacatur dataset:
Search Keywords: vacat*
Case Type: patents
None of these words: reset reexamination “briefing schedule” “status
conference” “markman hearing” “construction hearing” usca “case
management conference” transfer “early neutral evaluation” “patentterm” “administrative order” unseal compel discovery “pro hac vice”
limine default consolidating pretrial answer reply surreply response
opposition “docket control order” “referring motion” “referring case to”
“show cause” “scheduling conference” “initial disclosures” “protective
order” “scheduling order” cmc rescheduled
Event Date Range: 01/01/2006 to 01/03/2011
If the relevance of a specific docket entry was not clear, the corresponding
document was retrieved and reviewed. Documents not available on the IPLC were
downloaded from PACER. The terms for the “None of these words” filter were
chosen primarily to exclude the numerous items vacated in a typical case that relate
to scheduling or administrative issues.

APPENDIX B: WESTLAW SEARCH PARAMETERS
In Westlaw, three databases were searched for case documents that might
indicate that a settlement-related motion for vacatur was filed in the associated
case: U.S. District Court Cases (DCT), Andrews Patent Litigation Reporter Court
Documents (ANPATLR-DOC), and Federal Civil Trial Filings (FED-FILINGALL). The following search string was used:
(VACAT! /P SETTLE!) & (PATENT! NONINFRING! INVALID! “CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION” MARKMAN) & da(aft 12/31/2005 & bef 1/4/2011) %
(HABEAS CONVICT! EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYEE! EMPLOYER!
PRISON! “CLASS ACTION” “STATE LAW” ARREST! INSURANCE)
For each document in the search result that appears to have been filed in a patent
case in which a settlement-related motion for vacatur was filed, the associated
docket was reviewed on the IPLC or PACER (or both) to determine whether the
vacatur motion satisfied the subject matter and time restrictions of the vacatur
database.
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APPENDIX C: DOCKET NAVIGATOR SEARCH PARAMETERS
In Docket Navigator, the following search parameters were used to find court
orders that might indicate that a settlement-related motion for vacatur was filed in
the associated case:
Search 1:
Type of Information: Court documents
Posture of Motion: Stipulated/Agreed OR Motion to Vacate
Document Text: vacat
Search 2:
Type of Information: Court documents
Type of Court Document: Motion to Vacate Prior Order
Search 3:
Type of Information: Court documents
Legal Issue: Vacating Judgment/Order
For each document in the search result that appears to have been filed in
connection with a settlement-related motion for vacatur, the associated docket was
reviewed in Docket Navigator or PACER (or both) to determine whether the
vacatur motion satisfied the subject matter and time restrictions of the vacatur
database.

